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5. Patient, suffering from a painful skin eruption on his leg consulted Physic' 
for treatment. Physician diagnosed the trouble as eczema and ~rescribed X-ray t~:~t­
ment. The first treatment caused Patient's leg to swell and the second treatme t 
caus~d such a severe reaction as to necessitate the admission of Patient to a n 
hosp1tal. Patient suffered excruciating pain and incurred an expense for treatment 
in the amount of $1,500. T S5 
.Patient brought an action for damages against Physician in the Circuit Court f 
G1les County, alleging malpractice. Physician filed grounds of defense denv;ng 0 1 t' 1' . J~ any rna prac ~c~ or neg 1gence. Upon the tr1al of the case the only witness was Patient 
who test1f1ed to the matters s et out in the first paragraph of this question and 
rested. Physician's counsel thereupon moved the court for summary judgment in his 
favor. How should the court rule on this motion? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The motion for summary judgment should be granted provided 
that a motion to strike has been made and granted. In this case expert evidence 
must be offered by plaintiff as the issues involved are not capable of being de-
termi.ned by layman without the benefit of such evidence. See Rule 3:20 as effective 
June 1, 1957. 
7. AZ fu"e& Bee and Carson in the Circuit Court for $5,000 for personal injuries 
alleged to have been sustained by him, when Bee's automobi~e, in which Ames was a 
guest passenger, collided with one operated by Carson. Bee consults you and informs 
you that he holds the past due note of Ames for $10,000 and a bond made by Carson 
for $6 .• 500, also past due, and asks you whether he may enforce collection of either 
or both of these items in the present action. How ought you to advise him? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Bee may sue Ames on the note. Rule 3:8 reads in part, "---
a defendant may, at his option, plead as a counterclaim any cause of action at law 
for a money judgment in personam that he has against the plaintiff---". 
Bee cannot sue on the bond. Rule 3:9 reads in pa~t, "A defendant may, at his option 
plead as a cross-claim any cause of action that he has against one or more other 
defendants growing out of a~1y matter pleaded in the notice of motionfor judgment." 
The bond did not grow out of any matter pleaded in the notice of motion for judgment. 
vm~t..n a res1aenli or Pennsylvania, was killed in an automobile accident occurring ~~the city of Richmond. His Administrator, Jones,,qualifi~d properly_in Pennsylvani~ 
and instituted action in the proper court in the C1ty of R1chmond aga1nst Kyle, the 
owner and driver of the opposing automobile for $25,000 damages for the death of 
'"'mith. The accident occurred on July 29, 1956. Smith was killed instantly. Jones, ~he Administrator, appointed by the Pennsylvania ·court instituted his action for 
damages May 1 1958. Kyle by his attorney promptly filed a motion to dismiss the acti~n on the 1 ground that a foreign administrator could not bring this_acti~n i~ the 
Virginia Court. This motion was not passed ~n until Sept.l,l958, ~t.whlch t1me 1t 
was sustained and the action dismissed. On ~~-1,1958, Green qual1f1ed before the 
proper -court in the City of Richmond as ancillary administrator of Smith and he and 
Jones immediately instituted an action in the proper court of the City of Richmond 
against Kyle for ~~25,000 damages for the wrongful death of Smith. Kyle, ~Y his 
attorney, filed a motion for summary ~udgment on the ground t~at the act1on had not 
been brought wi:thin the statutory per1od from the death of Sm1 th. ;J ~- ~ 
How should the court rule on this motion? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The two year change (from one year) did not go into effect 
until July 1, 1958. Hence the action was barred on July 29, . 1957. Note: If we 
j t this case into the future by two years then the motlon for summary judgment ;~~u~~ be over-ruled as V#B -634 as amended in 1958 reads in part, "---but if any 
h t'on is brought within such period of two years after such person's death, =~~ f~~ ~ny cause abates or is dismi~sed without determining the merits of such 
t· the time such action is pend1ng shall not be counted as any part of such 
ac ~odn, f two years and another suit may be brought within the remaining period 
perlo 0 ' · t b · t · t t d " of such two years as if such former su1t had no een 1ns 1 u e • 
7. Harry Webb J.?s c~nlicted in tHe dbUbt# d~~~t of Henry Co~nty on April 23, 1959, 
for reckless driving. Twenty-four days ther~atter, on May 17,1959, Webb was again 
apprehended and charged with reckless driving. The warrant for this last offense 
charged that the a.ccused did "unlawfully operate a motor vehicle on the public road 
in a reckless manner. tt 
During the course of the trial, the Commonwealth attempted to introduce evidence 
of the previous uo.nviction of April 23, 1959. Counsel for Webb innnediately objected 
on the ground that evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible since the warrant 
on which Webb was being tried did not charge that Webb was being tried for a second 
offense. How should the Court rule on this objection? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Objection sustained. A man cannot be tried for a higher 
crime or a different crime from that with which he is charged. To allow such a 
practice is grossly unfair and would violate the constitutional requirement of due 
process. See 200 Va.341 on p.587 of the Pleading and Practice Section of taese notec 
7::> -.-q 
9. The action of Plaintiff v. Defendant was tried in the Circuit Court of wythe 
County on July 7,1959, on which date the jury brought in a verdict for Defendant. 
Immediately upon the return of the verdict Plaintiff's counsel moved to set it 
aside, the Judge took time to consider the motion, and, on July 31, overruled it 
and on that day judgment was entered that Plaintiff take nothing and that Defendant 
recover his costs from Plaintiff. Plaintiff then asked, and got, a ninety -day 
suspension of execution in order that he might apply to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals for a writ of error. 
(1) From what date must be computed the time within which the petition for a writ 
of error must be filed? 
(2) On the trial there was granted to Defendant, over Plaintiff's objection, an 
ins truction, initialed by the trial judge. What, if anything, need bn done to make 
this instruction a part of the record? 
(3) The evidence was transcribed. What, if anything, must Plaintiff do to have 
this transcript made a part of the record? (4) After re-reading the transcript of the testimony, Plaintiff's counsel, for 
the f i rst time concluded that certain evidence, prejudicial to his case, but to 
which no objecti on was made in the trial, was clearly inadmissible. This had not 
been menti oned in the notice of appeal and assignment of error. 
Will this question be considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) (1) By V#8-463 the· time runs from the date when a final 
as distinguished from an interlocutory judgment was rendered, i.e. July 3lst.Note 
it is not from the date that the judgment became final 21 days later. Of course if 
the original judgment is changed within the 21 days the time would run from the 
entry of the changed judgment. 
(2) Nothing more is required in this case. See Rule 5:1(3)(b). 
480. 
(3) If both counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant sign the transcript, and it is su·)-
mi t t ed to the judge within 60 days of final judgment and signed by him withi n 70 
days after the final judgment, it becomes part of the record when delivered to th? 
clerk. Rule 5:2(e). If counsel for opposing party refuses to sign, the proced~e 1 n 
Rule 5:2(f) must be followed. This procedure is essentially the same as that JUSt 
set forth above except that counsel tendering the transcript must give reas~nab~e 
wri t t en notice to the other party's counsel of the time and place of tender 1 ng ~t 
and a r easonable opportunity to examine it. 
•• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
5" roo . 7. On ~une 15,1960, Donald Lucas went to the used car lot of Roanoke Cars,Inc., to 
look at the several vehicles offered for sale. While there, Lucas fell ~nto conversa-
tion with Ben Harris, the Sales Manager of the Company, and inquired about a crimson 
colored Plymouth with a retractable top. On inspecting the vehicle, Lucas noticed 
that the speedometer indicated a total mileage of 19,000 miles and asked Harris 
whether that was correct. To this Harris replied: "It most certainly is. We never do 
anything to deceive a customer11 • Thereupon, Lucas bought and paid cash for the 
Plymouth at its listed price of $2,100 and received in return all necessary title 
papers, properly executed. On June 20th, Lucas learned that Roanoke Cars, Inc., had 
purchased the Plymouth from George Vest on June 12th, that, at the time of the sale 
by Vest, the vehicle had been driven 69,000 miles with that mileage shown on the 
speedometer, but that Roanoke Cars, Inc., had changed the speedometer reading. Lucas 
now asks you to inform him of what remedies at law or in equity he may have against 
Roanoke 6ars,Inc., and, if successful, the relief to which he will be entitled in 
each instance. What should you advise him? 
(PLEADING-•Torts--Sales--Equity)(l) Lucas may sue for the tort of deceit in which he 
could clearly recover the difference in value of the c*r as it is and $2100. (In 
some jurisdictions he could recover even in tort the difference of the value of the 
car as it actually was at the time of the sale and as it would have been if as 
warranted.) Since the deceit was intentional a jury could also award him punitive 
damages.(2)Lucas could sue for damages for breach of an express warranty recovering 
a judgment for the difference between the actual value of the car and the value of 
the car if it had been as warrant,ed. (3) Lucas could rescind in equity. He is entitled 
to return the car and get the $2100 back. 
8.~n GAFril 3, 1960, an action was tried in the Circuit Court of Goochland County 
wherein John Farragut sought to recover $15,000 from William Worth as damages for 
personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. On the same d y the jury 
brought in a verdict for Worth and judgment was entered accordingly~ on June 24 
1960, Farragut for the first time learned that during the course of the trial ' 
Worth's principal witness had secretly discussed the merits of the case with two of 
the jurors. He now seeks your advice on whether he may have the judgment set aside 
and a new trial ordered. What should you advise him? 
(PLEADING) I would advise him it was too late to do anything. The judgment became 
final 21 days after its entry under Rule 3:21. The alleged misconduct in this case 
is not so venal or corrupt as to justify the intervention of equity. 
9. ~G~bruary 2, 1957, a collisi on occurred in the City of Richmond between two 
motor vehicles, one driven by John Willis and the other by Russell Ford. Because 
of the collision, Willis suffered personal injuries and his automobile was badly 
damaged. AS spectators gathered around the scene of the accident, Ford, who was a 
creditor of Willis, walked up to him and said: "You dirty dog, this serves you 
right. As a man who has cheated me out ~f my m~ney, you ~eserve nothing be~ter." 
On June 15 1960, Willis brought an act1on aga1nst jord 1n the Law and Equ1ty Court 
of the cat; of Richmond. Willis• motion for judgment contained three counts; one 
seeking $10,000 for personal injuries, one seeking $1,112.50 for damage to his 
automobile , and one seeking $51000 for the slanderous remarks of Ford. Ford now 
consults you and, although admitting the collision was entirely his fault and 
f urther admitting that his statements to Willis were untrue, asks your advice on 
~That defenses, if any, he might make to each count of the motion for jud[ljment. What 
sho uld you advise him? 
(PLEADING) I would advise him that he has a defense as to both the personal injury 
and t he slanderous remarks because of the statute of limitations which is now two 
yeari in personal injury actions and probably one year in defamation actions. 
Since the five year statute has not yet run on the property injury action he i s 
l iable for the damages done to plaintiffs car. 
/ 
Tt;o 10. Assume the following facta: 
At ~:20p.m. on January 2,1960, while John Minter was riding as a guest passenger 
in an automobile driven by Alfred Moncure, the automobile collided with another 
vehicle driven by Herbert Potts. The collision occurred in clear weather· and on a 
straight stretch of U .S.Route 360 in Amelia County just west of Amelia Court House 
where both Moncure and Potts resided. The collision was virtually head-on, both 
automobiles were then traveling over the center line of the highway. As a result of 
the accident, Minter suffered a broken back and severe lacerations. He was hospital-
ized for three months and incurred medical expenses of $5,243. He has been unable 
to work since the accident, and his physician considers that he is permanently dis-
abled and will at no future time be able to engage in a gainful occupation. At the 
time of his injuries, Minter was regularly employed at an annual salary of $10,000. 
He is now 44 years of age and has a provable life expectancy of au years. 
Draw the appropriate pleading on behalf of Minter by which recovery is · sought 
against both Moncure and Potts. 
(PLEADING) See Burks Pleading and Practice(4th Ed) Paragraph 182 and note 22 thereto 
The proper pleading would be a mntion for judgment substantially as follows: 
COMMONWEALTH · OF VIRGINIA 
In the Circuit Court for the County of Amelia 
John Minter, Plaintiff ) ) v. 
Potts ) Alfred Moncure and Herbert 
(Addresses), Defendants 
Motion for Judgment 
) 
1. On or about 2:20p.m. of January 2, 1960, the plaintiff, John Minster, was 
riding as a guest passenger in an automobile owned and driven by the defendant, 
Alfred Moncure, in a westerly direction on a highway known as Route 360 in Amelia 
County just west of Amelia Court House. 
2. The defendant, Alfred Moncure drove the said car so recklessly, wantonly, 
and !n sucij a grossly negligent manner that he collided head on with the car driven 
in the opposite direction by the defendant, Herbert Potts, both cars peing over the 
center of the road at the time of the collision despite the fact that the day was 
clear and the road straight. 
3. Neither defendant was keeping an adequate lookout and the gross negligence 
of the defendant, Moncure, and the negligence of the defendant Potts, proximately 
resulted in serious and grievous injuries to the plaintiff as follows: 
4.(a)Medical expenses of $5,243;(b)permanent and total incapacity for re-
numerative work of any kind to plaintiff's damage of $200,000;(c)untold physical 
and mental pain,suffering, and anguish to the extent of $50,000; . 
Wherefore, the plaintiff moves this Honorable Court for judgment against the 
defendant, Alfred Moncure, or against the defendant Herbert Potts, or against both, 
in the amount of $275,000 besides the cost of this action. 
John Minter 
By Counsel 
(Signed)Jefferson Blackstone, Box 443, Williamsburg,Virginia, June 27, 1960. 
Df>D 1 • Langley purchased a washing machine from Field for $120, ard executed and de-
livered to Field his installment note for the purchase price. The note called for 
payments in twelve equal installments, the installments to be paid on the 1st day of 
successive months, to include interest at 6%, and in the event of default in the 
P§yment of any installment the whole debt would then become due and payable. After 
paying two installments, Langley missed a payment, and when another month went by 
without payment, Field obtained a judgment for the two past-due installments. 
Langley thereupon satisfied. the judgment, and no further paymenta were made. At the 
end of the year Field sued Langley to recover the talance of the note. Langley con-
sults you. What defense, it any, is available to him? 
(PLEADHD AND PRACTICE ) Langley has t he detense of res adjudicata. The whole swn 
was automatically due when default took place. No man should be twice vexed for one 
and the same thing. Th~ one cause of action cannot be split into two or more actions .-
See 168 Va.284, 191 S.E.608 on p.2200 of the Negotiable Instruments cases in these 
notes. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
6~~~rbert Mundy, Executor of the will of the deceased Stuart Chapman, duly brought 
a suit in the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond seeking advice and guidance in 
the administration of the estate. Mundy's bill raised numerous issues, one of which 
was whether a trust of Blackacre recited in paragraph 11 of the will violated the 
rule against perpetuities. After hearing evidence ore tenus, the Court entered an 
interlocutory order which found that the trust recited ~n paragraph 11 did violate 
the rule against perpetuities and that Blackacre passed by intestacy, and which re-
ferred to a commissioner in chancery all other matters raised by the bill with the 
direction tl1at the commissioner hear additional evidence on such matters and report 
back to the Court his findings. John Hash, one of the defendants in the suit but no 
relation of Stuart Chapman, is the principal beneficiary of the trust as recited in 
paragraph 11 of ·the will. He asks you whether he may seek an appeal from the inter-
locutory order, or whether he must await the entry of the final decree. What should 
you advise him? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) I would advise that he can seek an appeal at once. While 
the general rule is that an appeal lies only to final decrees there are a number of 
statutory exceptions one of which is that an interlocutory decree which adjudicates 
the principles of a cause is appealable. Code #8-462(2)(c). 
6 {) . 
8.bHarvey Bones sued Jake Hide to recover $25,000. In count one of the motion for 
judgment plaintiff sought to recover $20,000 damages for personal injuries alleged 
to have been sustained by plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligent 
operation of his automobile. In count two of the motion for judgment plaintiff 
sought to recover $5,000, the purchase price due under a written contract between 
the parties relating to the sale of .a valuable horse. The defendant demurred to the 
motion for judgment and also filed a counterclaim to recover damages for a trespass 
to his real property alleged to have been committed by the plaintiff. Plaintiff de-
murred to the count~claim.(a)Is the motion for judgment demurrable?(b) Is the 
counterclaim demurrable? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) (a) A~ demurrer lies to the motion for judgment as a count 
in contract cannot be joined with one in tort at least where the two counts arise -
out of independent transactions. 94 Va.775, (b) The counterclaim is not demurrable. 
Rule 3:8 permits counterclaims whether or not they are in contract or in tort, 
whether or not they are liquidated, and whether or not theyArise from any trans-
action mentioned in the motion for judgment. 
J~ l . 9., 1'he Circuit Court of Arlingt,on County, Va., entered a final judgment in an action 
at law against Shepard on the 1st day of Feb.l961. Shepard promptly directed his 
attorney to take the necessary steps to perfect an appeal. Whereupon counsel for 
Shepard, within the time prescribed by law, obtained a certification of the testimony 
and other incidents of the, trial by the trial judge and filed his notice of appeal 
and assignments of error. On the 15th day of May,l961, counsel for Shepard filed 
with the clerk of the circuit court a designation of the parts of the record that he 
wished printed and, pursuant to direction of Shepard's counsel, the clerk transmitted 
the record to one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals on the 29th day of 
May,l961. A writ of error was granted upon a Petition presented to the same Justice 
of the Court on the 30th day of May,l961. At the time the case came on for argument 
counsel for defendant in error moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the' 
writ of error had been improvidently awarded. How should the Court rule? 
(PLEADING AND' PRACTICE) The motion to di~miss should.be g:anted. Section 6(a) of 
Rule 5:1 provides that counsel for appellant shall f~le w~th the clerk of the Court 
from which an ap~al is talcen, not less than 20 days before the record is transmitted 
a designation of the parts of the record that he wishes printed. This is mandatory ' 
nd involves the exercise of dlscretion rather than being a purely ministe :cial act. 
CNote that by May 15th it is too late to provide for the 20 days as the overall four 
months period runs out orl June 1st.) See 192 Va.329 in the Cases on Pleading and 
Practice in these notes. 
6.~Lssenger was injured when a taxicab owned and operated by Cabbie and in which 
Passenger was being transported, collided with an automobile owned and operated by 
Brown at a street intersection in Radford,Va. Passenger instituted an action by 
1notion for judgment against Cabbie in the Corporation Court of Radford, seeking 
damages for his injuries. Upon service of process, Cabbie immediately moved the 
Court to enter its order requiring Passenger to amend his motion for judgment to 
bring Brown in as a defendant, on the ground that there was a non-joinder of parties. 
In support of his motion Cabbie filed an affidavit stating that Brown was subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Court and that Brown was guilty of negligence which proxi-
mately contributed to the accident. How should the Court rule on Cabbie's motioni 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Cabbie's motion should be denied. Tort liabilitl here is 
joint and several and plaintiff can sue one or both at his option. Rule 3:9.1 abolish• 
es third party practice in actions at law. 
7Jl6arpenter, a building contractor, instituted an action by motion for judgment 
against Hanson, alleging that Carpenter had contracted to construct a home for 
Hanson, that the construction had been completed in accordance with the contract, 
but that Hanson had refused to pay for the same. Upon being served with process in 
this action, Hanson immediately filed his counterclaim against Carpenter in which 
Hanson alleged that the construction had been performed in such an unworkmanlike 
manner that Hanson was compelled to expend large sums of money in order to make the 
house habitable, for which he soug~t judgment against Carpenter. 
On the morning of the trial, before the jury was impaneled, Carpenter moved the 
Court for a continuance of the action on the ground that several witnesses on whom 
he relied, but who were not subpoenaed, were unable to be present. The Court over-
·~u~ the motion. The trial proceeded, and after both parties had rested and the 
jury had been instructed and the attorneys had concluded their arguments to the jury, 
Carpenter's attorney sensed from the expressions of the jurors that his case had 
fared poorly because of Carpenter's lack of expert witnesses, and as the jury was 
preparing to retire to consider its verdict, Carpenter's attorney moved the Court 
to be permitted to suffer a non-suit, which motion Hanson's attorney opposed. 
How should the Court rule on Carpenter's motion for a non-suit? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)Dy V#8-244 a non-suit cannot be taken where defendant 'has 
filed a counterclaim as defendant should then have the right that the whole matter 
(including his counterclaim)be determined. The last sentence reads, 11In such caae 
the plaintiff shall not, after the counterclaim is filed, dismiss his case without 
the defendant's oonsent. 11 
lol:>~nider, a widowe:c, died lea\•ing a vrill which named his sL-;: sons as beneficiaries, 
and leaYing a large estat@) compo,3ed of a variety of asnets. The six sons disagree<i 
among thC"..mselves al'l to the me.-:l.ning of t he \vill9 so that each t ook exception to the 
executor's proposed distribution. The executor inetltuted a suit to construe the 
wil~ in the proper court, and in which suit he soug!!.t tho cour)ljas guidance in the 
adm~nistration of the est.f;\te. 'fhe six sons we;:-e d~fendants in the cause. The cause 
matured ard wa~ referred to a special <;omrnission8r who was directed to take evidence 
and to report t~ the court. 
After the repw~ of the sr~ cial commiGsioner was ~iled and exceptions thereto were 
taken by't;everal oR the part~es , the court entered ~ ts de~reG construing the will 
and decreeing the dis tribution of the es tate to the beneficiaries . The day afte!' this 
deer~ was entered, one Ha,rpie seeks your adv.i.ce and tells you that just before the 
decree was entered~ he took an ass:i gnrnent of the interost :i_n the estate of one of the 
distributee sonc, as securi ty f or a debt O'rl'ed him by that son. He wants to assert 
hia assignment against the sonls dintributive share i n the estat0, but the executor 
hal'.l refused to honor Harpie 1 s clairr1o In what manner, if any, can Harpie assert his 
right in the suit? 
(Pl£ADING AND PRACTICE ) SinGe the de~ree is nr t yet final and Harpie now has a sub-
stantia.JJ interest in the caoe te should petition 'to intervene . See Rule 2:15, "A 
new; party may by pot.ition filed by l eave o.f court assert any claim or defense germane 
to ~he subject matter of the sui t. 11 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
lO;(~~ble filed a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of Lee County,Va., against 
Granite, seeking specific performance of a written contract for the sale of a tract 
of land known as "Tombstone." Granite filed an answer in which he did not admit . the 
existence of the written contract, called for proof thereof, and denied that plain-
tiff was entitled to the relief sought. The answer did not set out the reasons for 
which relief should be denied. The trial court heard evidence ore tenus at which time 
plaintiff proved the written contract. The court permitted the-aefendant to prove 
over the objection of counsel for the plaintiff, that he had not seen the propert; 
before the contract was signed; that before the contract was signed he had been 
advised by his friend, Slab, that the .property was improved by a newly constructed 
brick residence, and that the property fronted on a hard-surfaced state highway; 
that after the contract had been signed he examined the property and found that his 
friend had been mistaken about the property he was seeking to purchase, and that the 
property described in the contract was not improved by a modern brick dwelling nor 
did it front on a hard-surfaced state highway and, because the property he was 
purchasing was not as represented by his friend, that it had a value of a least 
$20,000 less than the agreed purchase price. The record consisted of the pleadings 
the written contract which had been filed as an exhibit, and the decree of the cou~t. 
After hearing argument of counsel the court entered a decree containing the follow-
ing language: 
"This cause came on to be heard upon the appearance of the parties, in person 
and by counsel, upon evidence heard ore tenus, and upon due consideration 
whereof the court doth adjudge, order-ana-aecree that plaintiff is not 
entitled to specific performance of the \>II'itten contract filed as an ex-
hibit with the bill of complaint in this cause. And this suit is dismissed 
at the cost of the plaintiff, and the clerk is directed to place it among 
causes ended." 
Three months after the date of the entry of said decree Marble consulted his 
lawyer and advised that he desired that some action be taken in an attempt to obtain 
the relief sought in his bill of complaint. Ten dave a.fter thi,. , .. d . ,.,.......,fArence with 
1 . t counsel for plaintiff filed a b~ll of review charging that there was 
· h i5 c 1.en ' ""'-i d 1 · d t 
· on· the face of the record in that the court had aw•1 tte para ev1 ence o e'~'"ror up t d · th t th t v.;1. and contradict the terms of the written contrac , an pra·~ng a .. e cour yl the decree entered by the court and enter a decree grant1.ng spec1.f1c perform-
a.llnu r~ Marble entitled to the relief sought by the bill of review? ~~~I~G AND PRACTICE) No. There is no error of law apparent on the ~ace of the . 
\ d N steps were taken to incorporate the evidence heard orally 1.nto the record. 
recor • o 'd d h Since the Chancellor's decision could have been based on that ev1 ence, an no sue 
'd 1.'a in the record there is no error of law apparent on the face of the 
ev:J. ence ' .1 d 1 · thi d Note· Under V#B-613 a bill of review may be f1 e n a proper case Wl. n r~cor ·ths nex.t after a final decree has been entered. Note that the 21 days limita-
Sl.X man · i t li bl 
. i R le 2•22 with reference to the final1ty of decrees s no app ca e as a tJ.on 11 u • bill of review only lies for a review of a final decree • 
6.0~km Srni th asks yct'.r advice on the following questions: 
(1) How is an action at law commenced in Virginia? 
(a) If the defendant wishes to challenge the v anue, how and when must this be 
done? 
(3) If the defende.nt does mt thj nk that a cau.sc of action has · been . stated 
against him, how and when mr:.y t.he qt'.estion be r~.iscd? ·- · 
(4) If the defendant ·beL.eves the plaintiff owes him money because of a matter 
not arising out of the t:ran.:>C1c ·;;ion sued upon, may he assert this claim in the pend-
ing suit? How ought y·ou to answer ea.ch of these c;_uestions? 
8., (PLEADING AND PRA.CTICE) (1) Bv filing in the cle:r·k' s offi~P. a mo·tion for judgment 
and by payin;5 the rcq•1ired w:d t tax and de pod t. agai:nct, cos-::,,s. Rule 3:3 (a). 
(2) By a plea in abatement filed before or si..l!lcltanec·usly <:ith(but not after) a 
demurrer, plea in bar, or . plc~a tc the merits wi7;,h~.!l 21 days af'i:.er service of the 
notice of motion for jt'.dgmenij on the def~ndant. Hule 3 ~ 6. 
(3.) By a demurrer filE<d before the ecpi:r.ation of 21 days llftf)r service of the notice 
of motion for j~tdgment on the def"-':nr.'.ant o. R.u.le J t 5; 01.' in &u~ne cases by a motion for 
summar~r judgment as par Rule 3:20. 
(4) Yes, by Rule 3:8. 
7 ,l>~r.ucker was operating a tractor-trailer eastwardly on Main St., follolv-ed by 
Hiddleton operating a Bu~.ck, ~:ho, in turn, was followed by Motox-ist driving a Ford 
automobile. Trucker stopped and Middleton ran into the trailer and Motorist ran 
into Middleton's B1 icko Both Motorist and fliddlcton received personal injuries and 
their cards were damaged. 
Motorist has sued both Middleton a~1d T:u•~kf:::ll.' fc:r: his darr..3.ges, alleging negligence 
on the part of each of them. Middle~o::-1 c:or.sclto you as tv -whether tn this action 
he can (a)file a claim against Hotoriot for hi::: tam~g~;s~ c:>.ni(b) file a claim 
against Trucker for the same daw2.ge8. lhnr Ol!ght. you to advise him? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) Yec, "-.S a ccuntel'(.laim under Rule 3:8 (b) Yes, as a cross· 
claim under Rule 3:9 vrhich read~ in pa:'t, "A defendant may, at his option, plead as 
a cross-claim any cause of action tbat h3 has against on3 or more other defendants 
growing out of any matter pleaded in ths notice of motion for judgment." 
8))b1antor was indicted n:1d t:-~ieu in the Circuit Court of Wythe County for murder, 
found guilty and sentenc.ed to confinement in the peni t.entia:!'y. He was defended by 
Mr. B., a youthful practitioner. A month lat3r Cabtor' s father employs you to see 
if you can find any ground upcP- whil;h the convietion me.y now be contested success-
fully. Upon ex~ning into the matter you find the foll~wing: 
(1) The writ of venire facif'.s commanded the sheriff to summon eighteen persone 
instead of twenty as requirGd by statu.te. 
(2) The killing actua l ly occurr ed about a mile over t he ~ ~J\.mty line in Gray~on 
County. 
- ' 542 ., i . ~ · . . -~·;. ·. 
~' A::. the trial ths court instructed the jury that if they believed by a preponder·~ 
anc e of the evidence that th~ defendant was guilty then they should find a verdict 
oi' guilty. 
4) 1'!-lat the defendant was not p'res~nt in the courtroom when the jury returned its ver 
d~~t and was discharged, although he was in the custody of the sherif~ at.the time. 
How 011ght you to advise on each ot these points, assuming that no obJeCtlon was made 
3.G to any of them at the time of the trial? 
(PLEADI NG AND PRACTICE) (l)and(3) By Rule1:8 "All objections to writs of every ki nd 
~~ * * (a nd) instructions * -:~ * shall state with r easonable cartainty the grouud of ob-
j ection,and, unless it appears from the record to have been so stated, such object-
io?s will not be considered by this court except for good cause shown, o~ to en~ble 
th1s court to attain the ends of jus·t.ice". It is arguable t hat the error 1n the ln-
st.ruction is so great t hat the exception stated above is applicable. (2) By Rule 1:8 
objections to venue must be made before verdict.(4) In felony cases the accused mast 
be present at every stage of the trial. Hl:l cannot waive this right. Since the time 
for an appeal has not gone by an appeal lies. Since defendant is being held illegally 
htJ i s en·t,itlel:l ''en ~ ari t nf habea's corpus • 
• 
• 
-j]:.V 
6.' ~o secure a valid personal judgment, on whom should process be served in the 
following actions at law in Virginia: 
(a) A resident plaintiff against a nonresident operator of an automobile for 
personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident occurring in Virginia, the 
nonresident not being in Virginia at the time of instituting the action? 
(b) An action for libel against John Smith, a resident of Roanoke, aged twenty 
years? 
(PLEADING and PRACTICE)(a) By V#B-67.1 process should be served on the Commissioner 
of Motor Vehicles. (b) Process(to be absolutely sure) should be served on the infant 
and his guardian ad li tern where a personal judgment or decree is desired. 11 But in 
order that the infant may thus become * * * a party to the suit, and bound by the 
proceedings, it is essential that the guardian ad litem enter his appearance by 
answer or otherwise." V#8-88 implies that where a guardian ad 11 tem is regularly 
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appointed, there need be no service of process on the infant, but t h::;re is some do,J.I:ri: 
as to whether or not the statute i~:; constitutional as against an infant's contenti')X~ 
that it lacks due process to hold him personally when he has not been served. See 
BUl~ks 1 (3d Ed o) pp.68-70, and Lile's Equity Pleading ar~ Practice (2d Ed.)##59 
through 68. 
f "?--1· A motion for judgment, after proper formal allegations as to parties and juris-
diction, contained a numbered paragraph reading: 
!liThe plaintiff moves the court for judgment against the defendant ~ .n th3 
st~:.n of 'J\ m Thousand Dollars because the defendant negligently operated his 
automohile thereby striking the plaintiff and causing him serious bodily 
injury ~ " No other allegations were contained in the moti.on for judgment. 
The defendant demurred to this pleading, assigning e.n ~rou:1ds therefor t.ha·\i 
i t did not set out the particulars , (a)of the negligence, nor(b) of the injurj_ee~ 
The defendant e.lso filed a plea stating t.h:'.t: 11 The supposed cause of action iF.: 
barred by the statute of limitations." The plaintiff moved the court. to strike this 
plea because it did not specify the particular stetute relied on. How should the 
court rule on(l)the demurrer and (2) the motion to strike? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Defendant's demurrer should be overruled. Instead of demurr-
ing in(a)he should ask for a bill of particulars. See Rule 3-18(d). By Rule J-18(i) 
"An allegation that an a~tion is barred by the statute of limitations is sufficient 
without specifying the particular stat,ute relied o~1.n 
91 1>ia.intiff sued defendant in the Circuit Court of Green County,Va., for $1,000 
damages to his automobile. On .January 10,1962, the case was t:::-ied and the jury re-
tur ned this verdict: '~We, the jury, u.pon the issue joined find for the plaintiff 
and assesa his damages at ~P.35o ~ u Def endant, by counsel, immediat<:lly moved to set 
aside the verdict and enter final judgment in his favor or in lieu thereof moved to 
set aside the verdict and award a new trial o The judge took the motions under ad-
visement and on January 31,1962, overruled both motions, and entered final judgment 
for the plaintiff. 
on April 6th, defendant, by counsel, filed in the clerk 1 s of fie8 a notice of 
appeal and assignment of error and on the same day, without saying anything to oppos-
ir.g ~counsel, presented to the trial judge~ transcript of the oral testimony and 
other incidents of the trial; this transcr1pt was s i gned by t he judge on April 14th 
and on that day filed in the clerk's office; on May lOth defendant's counsel in-
structed the clerk of the circui t court to transmit the record to the clerk of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals forthwith. Assume you repr esent pl aintiff . Point out all 
the errors i f any, in the above procedure. 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) 'i'he notice of appeal and as s i gnment of errors were not filed 
wi thin 60 days of the entry of final judgment on January 31; there was no designa-
t i on of the part of the re~ord to be printed; there was no r easonable written notice 
to ~pposing counsel by the counsel t endering the transcript of t he oral testimony; 
more than sixty days since final judgment elapsed before this t r anscript was present-
ed to the trial judge, nor -vras it signed by hi m wi thin the :required 70 days. See 
Rule 5:1. 
4~lfred Curtis, a resident of the City of Richmond, filed a motion for judgment in 
the Law and Equity Court of that city seeking damages of John Clark, a publisher, 
charging him with having printed in the Charlottesville Daily Gazette a libellous 
article concerning Curtis. Clark resided in Charlottesville and process was serfed 
on him at his place of residence. Two weeks after service on him, Clark, without 
appearing specially, simultaneously filed in the Law and Equity Court a sworn plea • 
in abatement alleging improper venue and grounds of defense denying the allegations 
of the motion for judgment. At a subsequent heaing, Curtis moved the court that it 
overrule Clark's plea in abatement on the grounds(a)that Clark submitted himself to 
the jurisdiction of the court by not appearing specially on filing the plea, and(b) 
that Clark waived all right to plead in abatement by simultaneously filing his 
grounds of defense. Should the court sustain the motion of Curtis on either, or 
both, of these grounds? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) No. The second paragraph of Rule 3:6 reads, "A plea in abate • 
ment or motion to quash process need not be filed upon a special appearance, and 
may be filed by the defendant in proper person or by counsel. Such plea or motion 
is not waived by the simultaneous or subsequent filing of other pleadings, whetl1er 
upon special or general appearance, nor by trial on the merits.n 
")) S:Y~erbert Jones brought an action agai n&t Tom Rust in the Corporation Court of the 
City of Petersburg. The motion for judgment prayed for judgment in the amount of 
$5,000, and alleged that Rust was indebted to Jones in that sum as evidenced by a 
promissory note made by Rust to the order of Jones on Dec.l,l961, that such note 
called for payment on June 1,1962, but that payment had been refused though demanded. 
Rust filed a demurrer to the motion for judgment, asserting as the grounds of de-
murrer: (a)that the promissory note had been paid, and (b) that the matter was res 
~udicata in that a similar action had been decided adversely to Jones in the Circuit 
ourt of Chesterfield County. How should the court rule on each ground? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The demurrer should be overruled. A demurrer lies only to 
what is stated on the face. of the motion for judgment or other pleading. This motion 
did not allege that Rust had paid the note, or that the issue had already been de- • 
cided by another court. Rust's defenses should be taken advantage of by special 
pleading in his Grounds of Defense and not by demurrer. 
6~nkle accepted employment with American CorP,Oration at its Richmond plant and, 
in contemplation of moving his family from Detroit, entered into a written contract 
with Henry Grim to purchase Grim's residence in Henrico County. The contract provided 
for a purchase price of $161 000, but did not recite the time or manner of paym£nt. 
The contract was executed on June 1, 1962, and provided for settlement to be made 
on December 31,1962. On November 15th, Winkle received .a telephone call from Grim 
inquir·ing as . to: t he rnr.nner of ~pa.;yment of theJpui.!chase pric P. . Grim tbldtWinkl~ that • 
he CQnaidered that he was to be paid all cash at the time of settlement. Winkle re-
plied by saying that he understood tt~t Grim was to receive only $4,000 at the time 
of settlement, and was to take an installment promissory no t e for the balance,auch 
note to be secured by a deed of trust. After a bitter argument, Winkle hung up the 
telephone. On November 30th, Winkle brought an acti on for declaratory judgment 
again@t Qrim8in the Circuit Court of Henrico County, alleging a justiciable con-
troversy between himself and Grim and requesti ng entry of a judgment declari ng that 
he was obligated only to pay $4,000 to Grim on the date of settlement and give a 
promissory note secured by a deed of trust for the balance. Grim has demurred to the 
moti on for judgment, assigning as his ground of demurrer that there is no justici-
abl.a .. ·cont.roversy between. himself and Winkle, since perfonnance of the contract is 
not to be made until Dec.)l,l962. How should the oourt rule on the demurrer? - . 
(:PLEAD!Rl AND PRACTICE) ':l'het danurrer eho\lld be overruled. The Tery pu-pose of the 
Declaratory Judgment Aot. ia to determine the rights of the partiea(in case of a 
genuine controversy) in adTame. See VN8•S78. PreTentiTe relief 1a the mortng • 
purpose. 
• 
• 
9 ~ i b.er Huffman, a widower and guardicm of his three children, brought sui t in the 
Circuit Court of Giles County to have sold am apportioned among them the sharel ot 
his children, aged 10,12 and 16 years, i.~ a tract of land on Sinking Creek Mountain 
in Giles County, which land Huffman had previously conveyed to them. The Bill in 
ChanCery was not verified. Process was e>.:ecuted on the three children by the 
Sberift of Craig County, who made personal serv~ce on each of them at their home in 
that Count;y. A guardian~ 11tem was appointed tor the children, who, together with 
the children, filed UMWOrn answers to the Bill. Thereafter, clepoaitiona were taken 
JW'8Uant to notice in the office of Huff'man • s lawyer w1 th only 'lihe lawyer, Huffman 
and hie three children present. 
Tbe record, ebold.ng only the foregoing procedural steps, has bean presented. to 
you as Judge ot the Circuit Court ot GUee CO<'.nty. Recite the procedural error s, 
11' any. 
(p:-:JW)Itll AND PRACTICE) Procedural errors are e.s tollowaa 
1. The Bill in Chancery should have been verified by the oadtb ot the plaint:Ut. 
W~-~1~ - ~IJ • 
2. The guardian ad li tern and the infant over 14 years of age should have answered 
the bil l on oath in proper person. V#8·679. 
). The evidence should have been taken in the presence of the guardian ad litem. 
Liles Equity Pleading and ~~ctice (Meade) #410 • 
. IP>' 
10J, on July 7,1960, in the Circui t Court of Fairfax County, Ruby Overfelt was award-
(~d a verdi ct of $10,000 against Beulah Armbrister. Immediately thereafter the defend-
ant,, by counsel, moved to set asi de the verdict as contrary to the law and the 
evidence. On October 20,1960, the Judge heard arguments on the motion and proceeded 
to render hi s decision, holding that the verdict of the jury be sustained. He ad" 
vised each counsel to submit an order giving judgment in accordance with the verdict, 
and an November 4,1960, he received the draft of each order submitted by counsel. 
Not being satisfied with either draft the Judge resolved the differences, drew his 
own order, antedated the same to October 20,1960, endorsed it and delivered the 
original to the Clerk with copies to counsel . The transcript of evidence endorsed by 
both counsel was forwarded by counsel for the defendant to the Judge at Fairfax, 
and on December 26,1960 it was received by t he Judge who signed it, and on the same 
day delivered it to t he Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. 
was the transcript of the evidence properly made a part of the r ecord for purposes 
of an appeal to the Supr~e Court of Appeals of Virginia? 
(PI.JYU)ING AND PRACTICE) Yes. The &J day per i od for submission of the transcript of 
t he evidence cannot be cut down by a reprospecti ve nunc ~ ~ order. The judgment 
was entered on November 4 even if rendered on Octob~O. The period runs from the 
entry-not the rendi tion. See 193 Va.390 on p .565A of the Pleading and Practice 
Cases in these notes. 
l~~n May of 1963 Davi d St reet entered into a written contrac t by the terms of 
1•hich he agr eed to sell to Robert Fores t a r esidence owned by him i n the City of 
Danville . The residence was one in a '' r ow" of houses , each being quite s i mi l a:· t o 
the others and the major ity being for sale at t he same price f or which Street had 
ag:reed to sell t o Forest. Short ly thereaf t er Fores t informed Str eet that he :.:•0!'use 
to make the purchase . Thereupon St reet brought a suit fo r specific perfonnan~8 e.-
gains t Forest i n the Co :L"poration Court of the City of Danville . Af t er Forest l:ad 
filed his answer denying liabilit y, the court heard evi dence ore t enus and ente:::- 8 d 
an order finding that Street had an adequate r emedy at l aw and direc t ing the tra:u:d 
of the case f rom the equity s i de to t he l aw s i de of the court f or the impanel"~:iJ .. of 
a jury to assess damages . No decis ion has ye t been made on the quest i on of da1,1 .•. : ~ . ,1 : :· : 
Street , much upset by t he action of t he cour t , inquires of you whether he may, T !; 
t hi s stage of the proceeding, undertake an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appoa~' [; .. 
lr{nat shoul d your a.dvice be? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE ) I would advise that he coul d . While ordinarily only fino.l 
decr ees and judgments may be appeal ed, interlocutory order s or decr ees of a cour· ~ 
of' equity which adjudicate the principles of a cause are appealable . See V#B-462. 
,-r,,);, 
5-/-'rn an action at latv pending in the Circuit Court of Augusta County, Va., E oZ. 
Hopalong sought to recover d~ages from Hank Salmon for an alleged breach of warrant~ 
After the parties were at is$.u.e plaintiff s~rved upon defendant a written notice 
that he would take the deposition of William Stout, a resident of Augusta County, at 
a fixed time and place. Stout was actively engaged in business in Augusta County 
and had knowledge of facts material to the issues in the case. Upon receiving ths 
notice counsel for defendant ·~nquired of counsel for plaintiff his purpose in taking 
the deposition and he was adv:i~sed that his lntention was to commit Stout to answers 
under oath so that he could use the deposition for corss-examining him at the time 
of trial. Counsel for defendant strongly desires to prevent the taking of the 
deposition. 
(1) By what procedure may counsel for defendant object to the taking of depositon? 
(2) Does defendant have grounds upon which to successfully oppose the taking of 
the deposition? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(l) Rule 3:23(a) reads, "A party may object to the taking of 
a deposition de bene esse by moving the court, promptly aft.er receiving notice of 
the taking of the deposition, to quash the notice unJ.ess satisfied that the taking 
of the deposition is in good faith for the purpose of taking and introducing the 
testimony of a witness who may not be able to attend the trial of the case." (2) 
Yes, since plaintiff does not wish to take the deposition for the purpose of intro-
ducing it as the testimony of a witness who may not be able to attend the trial of 
the case as required by Rule 3:23(a). 
6f00ladys Honeywell sued West Lake Hospita~,Inc., a non-charitable corporation, in 
the Circuit Court of Brunswick County, Va., to recover damages for personal injuries 
alleged to have been sustained by her while she was upon the hospital premises 
visiting her mother, a patient in the hospital. In her motion for judgment plaintiff 
charged that the defendant was negligent in the following particulars: 
111. The maintenance of a step in the hospital in a defective and dangerous 
condition; 
11 2. Failure to keep the steps properly lighted; and 
"3. Failure to have hand rails on the steps which could be used by the plaintiff 
when descending the stairs." 
Defendant filed the follov1ing responsive pleading: 
"Defendant assigns the following grounds of defense: 
11 1. Defendant denies it mai ntained a step in the hospital in a defective and 
dangerous condition) 
11 2. Defendant denies that it failed to keep the steps properly lighted; 
11 3. Defendant denies that it failed to have ha.nd rails on the steps which could 
be used by the plaintiff when descending the stairs." 
During the trial of the case plaintiff offered evidence to prove the averments 
contained in her motion for judgment and rested. Defendant then offered to prove by 
the superintendent of the hospital that plai ntiff, while walking down the steps 
with very high heels, was talking to a companion, that she did not look where she 
\>Jas going, and that her ankle gave way because she stepped too close to the edge 
of the steps thus causing her to fall. Counsel for plaintiff objected to the intro-
duction of this evidence. Is the evidence admissible? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) No. Defendant is attempting to pro'Te that Plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent. In order to do this he must affirmatively allege con-
tributory negligence in his responsive pll:eading or rely on contributory negligence 
shown by plaintiff's own evidence. Rule 3:18(h). 
-· 
• 
• 
/.f{'~ . 
9 '") ?n the ~vem.:.ng ?f Hay 1~ 1963, Frank Cox visited John vJater.s in his spacious 
res1.den~e 1.n the C1.ty of Rl.Chmond, such r8sidEmce having a fair market value of 
$95,000. Waters was an elderly bach3loro During the visit Cox falsely informed 
Waters that he was th'3 son of Hiram Cox, a wealthy old college classmate of waters 
whom Waters had not seen fer many years, In fact, Frank Cox was not the son of 
Hira~ Cox but was a person of bad :,.·eputat:Lon and o.f no finanoial worth. Waters 
rely~ng ~n the statement of Cox, ~~reed to sell him the residence for $50,000 ~d to 
r~ce1ve 1n exchange thsrefor Cox ' s unsecured p:romis::oi'y not8 in like amount payal:lle 
s1.x months after date. On May J:~d Waters executed anJ deliverl.'ld to Cox a deed COi.1•· 
v~ying to him the residence, and r eceived .frorn Cox thalatter's promissory note .f.nr 
$50,000. Shortly thereafter Cox duly recorded the deer:!. o ~!a ters, having now learr.P-d 
the true facts, has brought a suit against Cox in the Law and Equity Court of the 
City of Richmond seeking. a re.sciss~.?n of the. t-ra~sactio.n. He expresses to you hi f.: 
fear that, before. the su1 t can be f:;_n~lly de ·Ge ~·mJ.ned, Cox may convey the property 
to some unsuspoot1.ng person a~1d thus aeL'lat the rights of vv'-<ters. 
Waters asks what he might. qnickly do to pres'3rve those rights. What should you 
advise him? 
I" ·. , 
( FL.:'..ADING AND PRACTICE) r should advise him to file a notice of lis pendens in · · ~;l~ 
PY' O:f.Je~ c"L,rk' s office as per the provisions of V#8-lh2, and see that it is incl.e·;c3d 
:~ts . quJ.ckly aa pns si..bl e, .for it is .not deemed t o have "be ::m recorded unless anr.l unU. ! 
"Lr'.doxed as required b;r J !'"llJ . 
-:f&'-1 . l 3. f\ motion for judgment alleged that Defendant neghgent y 
and thereby struck Plaintiff and 0aused him scYere personal 
rTithin the permitted time, filed a paper setting out, t.mder 
the following: 
operat9d his automobile 
J.nJuries. Defendant, 
appropriate headings, 
(1) A demurrer because tha particulars of the negligsnce were net statad. 
(2) A motion for a bill of particulars of the injures sustained. 
(3) A cc,unterclaim agatnst Plaintiff for 4t2,500, balance due on a note • 
(4) That the action was barred. by a statute of limitations. 
(5) That he denied the charge of negligence. 
Plaintiff objeeted to the paper and moved to strike it out on the grounds: 
(a) That it was multifarious; 
(b) That Defendsnt was not entitlod to know the particulars of the injuries; 
(c) 'rhat it was not nf;Cessa:ty to set out the par·l;j_culars of the negligence; 
(dO That the countercJ.aim could not be asserted in the pending action; and 
(e) That the paper did not specify the particular statute of limitations relied on 
How ought the Court to rule on ea~h ground? 
(PJ~DING AND PHACTICE)(a) The objection of multifariousnes s is not valid. Rule 
3:18(j) reads, ''Grounds of defE:nse, counterC~laims, cross claims, pleas) demurrers, 
affirmative defenses and motions may all be included in the same paper if they are 
separately identified. 11 
(b) This objection is invalid. Rule 3:18(d) expressly provides for bills of 
particulars in proper cases of which this is one. . . 
(c) While it is not necessar;y- to set out the part:J..culars of the neghgence in the 
motion for judgment, it is necessary in the blll of particulars if one is properly 
ordered and this is reasonably possi ble. 
(d) Counterclaims are alloll:ed by aule 3:8, so this objection is untenable. 
(e) By Rule 3:18(i) an allegation t~at an actiol_l is barred by the_ statute of 1~­
tations is sufficient without speclfy1ng the pa:rt1.cular statute rehed on, so th~s 
objection is also invalid. 
4. Anderson sued Brovm, Carter an~ Daniel in the Circui~ Court of Clarke ?ounty for 
injuries sustained by Anderson wlul~ ~ gue~t passenger 1.n Brown 1 s automob1le ~hen 
it was involved in a three-'1-ray collJ.sJ.on mth cars operated by Carter and Damel. 
Carter within the proper tjmeJI filed his responsive pleading, d('lnying liability to 
Anders~n and asserting a claim against Brown and Dr.niel for injuries sustained by 
him(Carter ) in t he colli~ion. 
Anderson, Brown and Daniel all objected to this procedure. 
How ought the Court to rule? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The objection should be overruled. By Rule 3:9 a defendant. 
may, at his option, plead as a cross-claim any cause of action that he has against, 
one or more other defendants growing out of any matter pleaded in the notice of 
motion for judgment. 
/ 
9 1(orace Katzenjammer filed a bill in equity against Blithe Spirit praying the 
specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. The bill ~f complaint des-
cribed the land in detail and contained an averment that t he part~es had reduced 
to writing their agreement for the sale and purchase of the land. The bill further 
averred that complainant had tendered payment of the purchase price and had demanded 
a deed for the property, and that the defendant had refused to perform her contract. 
Blithe Spirit filed an answer to the bill of complaint admitting th~t there· h~~ been 
an oral contract for tf1e sale of. the l~d.~ arid that that agreement had been r educed. 
to writing but had b~en signed only by per, and that Katzenjammer had not signed thG 
wrh,ten agreement. Further ansvrering, &he averced that the written agreement was not 
under seal, and that, although Katzenjammer had tendered payment of the purchase 
price and demanded a deed, she refused to accept payment and to deliver a deed. 
How ought the sufficiency of the answer be tested, and how ought the Court rule? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) The sufficiency of the answer could be tosted by a motion 
to strike, or, in this case, by setting the cause down for acgument on bill and 
answer since all the undisputed facts are in the two pleadings. See Lile's Equity 
Pleading and Practice(Meade's Ed. ) ##228 to #231. 
(b) The court should rule for complainant. The Statute of Frauds only requires the 
party to be charged(i.e. the defendant) to sign. The statute is meant for the pro-
tection of those who did not sign, and thus might be at the mercy of unscrupulous or 
mistaken people who might testify falsely that defendants had orally promised, and 
not for the protection of those who have signed and thus have clearly promised. 
187 Va.lOl. 
'Db.?. 
1 • Defendant filed a demurrer to plaintif'f 1 s motion for judgment on the ground that 
it did not state a cause of action. The demurrer was argued on Nov.l,l962, and on 
tha same day the Court entered the following order: 
.,,This case came on to be heard and the Court is of the opinion that the demurrer 
is well founded and should bepustained: 
"In consideration whereof,lit is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the demurrer be, and 
it hereby is, sustained-, to which action ' of the court the plaintiff excepts.n 
On January 3, 1963, plaintiff filed a motion requesting l eave to amend his 
motion for judgment. State whether or not the Oourt could allow the request? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Yes, the court in its discretion could allow the request . 
Rule 3:13 reads in ?art, "Leave to ~~n~ shall be lib?rally granted in furtherance 
of the ends of just~ce. 11 Merely sUBta~mng or overrullng a demurrer is not a final 
disposi tion of the case unless the court goes further and dismisses the case . Hence 
the 21 day time limitation on the court's control over f i nal judgments has no 
application. 194 Va .394. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. (~ 5~0n July 1, ]961 John Rucker, being somewhat intoxicated, drove his automobile to 
the wrong side of the road and collided with an oncoming automobile, instantly kill-
ing the passenger therein, Ida Cole, and injuring the driver, Millie Cole, both of 
these parties being adults. an Septafuber 2, 1961 Millie qualified as administratrix 
of the estate of Ida Cole, and on Sept.l0,1962 she retained Attorney Will Dawson to 
represent her personally in an action for personal injuries, and also to represent 
her as administratrix in an action for the wrongful death of Ida Cole. On August 1, 
1963 Dawson filed both a motion for judgment against Rucker seeking a recovery for 
Millie's personal injuries, and a;motion for judgment against Rucker for the adminis-
tratrix seeking a recovery for the wrongful death of Ida. Process in each action was 
properly served on Rucker on August 6,1963, and on August 26,1963 he came to you and 
said that he wanted to resist the actions to the utmost. You agreed to represent him. 
What pleading or pleadings would you file in each action? When would you do so? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Note that the two year statute of limitations has run on each 
cause of action. As to the personal injury case I would rely on the running of the 
statute in my grounds of defense. It would be an affirmative defense by way of con-
fession and avoidance. Burks Ple~ding and Practice (4th Ed:) #236. 
As to the death action, whenever a right is ~reated by statute and the time within 
which such right must be asserted is laid down in the statute, then the time so pro-
vided is of the right, and not of the remedy, and the motion for judgment must 
affirmatively show that the action was commenced within the time allowed. If it does 
not so show, it is bad on its face and subject to demurrer or motion to strike. 
161 Va.373. 
A demurrer or grounds of defense should be filed within 21 days of August 6--
the date defendant was served. Rule 3:5. 
6•D'o"?n Sept.3,1963 in the Circuit Court of Southampton County, Butcher, a resident of 
Southampton County, instituted an a otion at law to recover damages for a tort al1;og-
edly committed in Nansemond County. The action was brought against Baker, a resident 
of Isle of Wight County, and Baker was served with process at his home. Baker retain-
ed Miller as his attor1~y, and through a ·misunderstanding, Mil]er believed that 
Baker lived in Southampton County. Miller, being very doubtful, but thinking that 
perhaps the motion for judgment, as a matter of law failed to state a cause of action 
on which plaintiff would be entitled to recover, filed a demurrer but did not file 
grounds of defense, this being done on Sept.20,1963. On Sept.21, Miller saw Baker 
and learned definitely that he lived in Isle of Wight County. Miller, believing it 
would be to Baker's advantage to have the case tried in another county, on the same 
day prepared and filed with the Clerk of the Qircuit Court of Southampton County an 
affidavit setting forth grounds which showed without question that Miller's failure 
to have the proper information as to Baker's residency was entirely excusable, to-
gether with the appropriate pleading to raise the issue involved. 
OU;Js (a) What appropriate pleading did Miller file? What would be the eround or ground~· 
for. same, and wha~ ~ould be the essential alleg~tio?s contqined in said pleading? 
- (o) What disposltlon sahould be made of the pleading? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) Miller filed a plea in abatement to test the venue. The 
ground for the ple.a would be that the proper venue was in Isle of Wight County where 
defendant lived, or in Nansemond County where the cause of action, if any arose. 
The essential allegations of such a plea would be that defendant was not ~ resident 
of Southampton County but of Isle of Wight County, and that the supposed cause of 
action, nor any part thereof, did not aris~ in Southampton County but in Nansemond 
County; i.e. the defendant must give plaihtiff a better writ. 
(b) Rule 3:6 expressly provides that no plea in abatement shall be filed by a de-
fendant after he has demurred, pleaded in bar, . or pleaded to the merits. The court 
should order the plea stricken • 
5.1t~iunes owned an antique desk which Roberts bought from him for $1,0001 and which 
Roberts paid, saying:''Keop the desk for. me until tomorrow and I will send a.nd get 
it.n Later the same day, William~ was at the James home, saw the desk, and offered 
James $1,500 for it. James accept.ed the offer, got the money, delivered thlt desk to 
vlilliams and left for parts unknown. 
Roberts tells you the above facts and he wants you to get the desk for him, saying 
Williams had it and claimed to own it. 
(a) What form of ac~ion would you institute? 
(b) Assuming both parties are residents of Wythe Coupty, in what court or courts 
might the action be brought? 
{c) Ho~-1 would it be instituted? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) A motion for judgment/in detinue. 
(b) It could be brought in the County Court of \·Jythe County since the value of the 
desk does not exceed $2,000, or, it could be brought in the Circuit Court of Wythe 
County since the value of the desk exceeds $300. 
(c) The action would be instituted in the County Court either by civil warrant or 
notice of motion for judgment. It would be instituted in the Circuit Court by filing 
in the clerk's office a motion for judgment and paying the required writ tax and 
deposit against costs. 
91~horney Edmunda represented plaintiff in a certain cou.rt action against the de-
fendant, alleging plaintiff was injur9d as a result of defendant's negligence, where· 
in defendant was represented by Attorney Fuller. A jury trial of the action resulteo 
in a verdict en March 3, 1964, for the plaintiff. Defendant's Attorney Fuller moved 
to set the verdict aside and enter judgment for the defendant on the ground that the 
verdict was contrary to the lavl and the evidence, or in the alternative, to grant 
defendant a new trial because of errors committed during trial. This motion was 
continued and was argJ.ed April 1, 1964, and the judge overruled the motion and 
entered final judgment for the plaintiff on the same daye 
Fuller then requested the court reporter to transcribe the evidence and though the • 
reporter promised that the transcript would be ready in fifteen days, he came ill 
and the transcript of the evidence was not delivered to Fuller until the morning of 
Hay 23, 1964. On the same day, Fuller served written notice on Edmunds that the 
transcript was in Fuller's office, available for inspection, and would be presented 
to the judge in his chambers on May 29, 1964, at 10:00 a~m. for certification. It 
was so presented, but E&nunds was not present at trus time and gave no explanation 
for his absence. In spite of Fuller's urging the judge to sign the transcript at 
o.-: . ..~. .. 
the tL"lle, the judge assured him th&t he would talce care of it in at least two days' 
time, but became busy and finally certified the transcript by signing it on June 8, 
1964. It was delivered to the clerk on the same dayo 
Fuller, believing that the judge would certify the transcript, had filed with the 
cl erk on May 29, 1964, a notice of appeal and assignments of error, the assignments 
of error being as follows: 
11 (1) The Court erred in entering judgment oh the verdict, as the same was oontrar;v 
to the law and the evidence in that the evidence showed as a matter of law that the 
defendant was free from negligence and the plaintiff was guilty of contributQry 
negligence. 
11 (2) Yne Court erred in granting improper instructions on behalf of the plaintiff 
and not granting proper instructions on behalf of the defen9.ant. 11 
(a) vlas the certification of the transcript timely and sufficient? 
(b) Were the notice of appeal and assignments of error timely and sufficient? 
(APPELLATE PROCEDURE)(a)Yes. It was tendered to the court within 60 days of the 
entry 6f final judgment and signed within 70 days. Opposing counsel was given reason-
able opportunity to examins the transcript. (b) The notice of appeal and assignments 
of error were timely as they were filed prior to the expiration of 60 days from 
final judgment as required by Rule 5:1(4). The first assignment of error is suffici-
ent because it states specifically the reasons relied upon, but the second assign-
ment of error is insufficient. It does not specify what instructions were improper 
or why they ·Here improper, or what proper instructions were refused. 
• 
s ?lr&ious instituted in the Circuit Court of Surry County on June 1, 1964, a suit in 
equity to quiet title to a certain parcel of land by filing his bill in the clerk's 
office, to which were atta~hed numerous docume~ts referred to in the bill as exhibits 
Bestman, Cutter, and Driller, all residents of Surry County~ were named defendants. 
Bestman and Cutter were served with process on June 15, 1964, but, after having the 
process for Driller in hand for twenty-two days, the sheriff made his return that he 
had been unable to effect service on Driller. 
Bestman feels that he has a valid defense to the suit and a valid claim for relief 
against Anxious in regard to a matter concerning the property in question and wishes 
to do whatever is necessary to establish his claim and, therefore, consults bis 
attorney on June 26, 1964. 
Cutter intends to dispute Anxious' claim and notes that ncne of the copies of the 
bill served on the defendants bave copies of the exhibits attached to them and that 
these documents are very mat:.erial to the issues and are necessary to have for 
answering the bill. Accordingly, Cutter raises the question as to Anxious' right to 
proceed with the suit since no copies of the exhibits were attached to the copy of 
the bill served on him, and also, consults his attorney on June 26, 1964. 
(1) What can and should Anxious do in regard to effe::J.ting valid service on Driller? 
(2) What can and should Bostman do in regard to asserting (a) his defense to the 
sui t, and (b) his claim flor relief against Anxious? 
(3) Is Cutter's contention in regard to Anxious' failure to attach copies of the 
exhibits Yalid? 
(EQUI'I'Y PL8:ADING) (1) Sinct: Driller is a residGnt of Surry County he should have 
him served by tacking process on the front door of his residen~e; or, file an 
affidavit that he cannot be found and then serve him constructively by means of an 
order of publication as per Rule 2 : 6 (b) • 
(2)(a) Bestman should assert his defense within 21 days either by filing responsive 
pleadings as per Rule 2:7 or an answer as per Rule 2:11. 
(b) He should file a cross-bill against Anxious to test his claim for relief 
agf:.~~st him. Wa£} No, Cutter's contention is not valid. Rule 2:3 reads in part, "It is not 
required that copies of exhibits filed with the bill be furnished or served ... 
6.Df1 final judgment in favor of Defendant wa.s ~n~ered June ~5, 1962 • On ,July 25~ 
l962 Plaintiff filed with the Cler ! of t he tnal court not1.ce of appeal_and ass:J.gn-
ment~ of error. On Augu.st 27, 1962 J counsel f?r Defenda.Ilt accepted ser~1.ce of a 
notiue that the tr2.nscript of t he e !fidence would be presented to the tr1.al court 
. tification en August 28 1962, Although pr8sent.ed t o the court on that day, for cer ' . 1 f' h · · t d the transcript was never presP-nted to oppos1.n~ counse or . l.~ Slgna· ure an _was 
not signed at the end by counsel for a~l part.1.es •. T~e cert1.f1.~at~ of the tnal 
judge was that the transcript twas te[:oered and s1.gn'-'d. by me v:l th1.n 70 days after 
final judgment." Among tho incidents of the trial ~he tran0cr ipt contained the following which 
w~s ef signad as error: 
Question by Plaintiff 's counsel: . 
"Q" Witn0ss state what Defendant was do1.ng when you first saw him? 
nDefendant's counsel-'! object'; the Court- 'Objection sustained '; 
Counsel for Plaintiff- ~Exception noted . 1n. 
(J. ) Should the appeal be granted? 
(2) If g·~r.nted should this assignment of error be considered? 
/PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(l) No. The tender of t he tanscript to the Court within 6o 
days of final judgment is jQ~isdictional. 204 Va.533 on p.)99.3 of the Pleading 
and Practice Cas0s of these Notes. (2) No. The grounds for objection must show what the expect?d a!1~W8r woL~ld have 
b 80 that the Appellate Court can t ell vrhether the errcr, 1.f any, was harmless 0;e~rejudicial. See 1 M. J . (Appeal and Error) #J05 • 
7~P~iter~ a widower~ died intestate July 1, 1951, seized of a farm and lea7ing su~­
v~vJ.ng hun three chll.dren, Tom, Dick and Harry. For several years before his death 
Pater had entrusted the possession and management of the farm to T\:lm, who had 
operated it as if it 1.;ere his ownft Di~k a nd his ~rife, by a writt2n agreement dated 
July 10, ::!..962, contracted to sell Dick's interest. in the land to Harry, but later 
Dick informed Harry that he had changed his mtnd and they wouldn't carry out the 
agreement. Tom continued in poosessi.on of the farm and in July 1 1964, Dick brought 
•:mi t for partition, making Tom and Hr:..rry parties. Proc <:>ss -vms sen·ed on Ha:rry, 
July 8, 1964 ~ On ,July 12, 1964, HeT!'Y consults you, tells you the foregoing facts 
and asks you the following qtl0.fY~ionr::: 
(a) May he in the present pr0ceeding, and if so how~ seek 2.n accounting from Tom 
because of h:Ls management of the fa.r.m? 
(b) May he, in the preS'ent proc;ceding, and if so h0<-1. seeu::-e an adjudication ef 
his right to compel Dick and his wife to comply with the cales contract? 
How ought you to answer these qu.astions? 
(PLF.ADING AND PRACTICE) (a ) Yes. Tom is a co-defendant, and Rllle 2:14 reads in 
part, 11A defendant may by cross-bill filed by leave of cow:·t assert against other 
defendants or against new parties any claim germane to the subject matter of the 
.:'.lUi t. tt 
(b) As against tbe plaintiff , Dick, Rule 2:13 provirles that a de.fmdant may file 
in t he clerk's office, within 21 clays after ser•.rice or thereafter by leave of 
cour-i:. a cross-bill which seeks relief c.::_:c>.ir1st t he plaintiff. But Dick's l-Jife was 
not a plaintiff. But Rule 2:14 above applies to her as these matters are all 
germane to the suit all parties c_a n be brought. l.n as per the above tv1o Rules. 
' 9,-VP~laintiff, while driving his automobile~ was injured in an accident that s.lso 
inv-ohred three other motor v ehicles operated cy X, Y and Z. Thinking that he had a 
s ·l;rong case against X and y and at best or~y a ~reak case against Z, Plaintiff 
b:cot1ght a:t action for $15,000 for peruonal injuries in the Circuit Court of Au.gust a 
County against X and Y, charging each with negligence that proximately caused the 
a.ccideni:.o You are employed by Y, who does not like Z and who wants to be informed. 
fully as to his rights. He is particularly interested in knowing which, if any , 
of the following claims y may assert in the pending action against the par~ies 
named.: 
(A) His claim against z for $25,000 for personal injuries arising out of th0 
same accidento 
(B) His claim against the Plaintiff and X, or either of them, for ~~25 ,000 for 
personal injuries arising out of the same accident. 
(C) His claim against the Plaintiff and X, or either of them, for ~14,000 for 
personal injurie:3 arising out of another c-.ccident. 
(D) His claim a.gainst the Plaintiff on the latter's nego t iable note for $5,000 
which is past due. (E) His claim against the Plaintiff and X, o>:> e;i the:- of them, on an open account 
for ~~2,000. (PIJEA.DING AND PRACTICE) (A) No. z is neither plaintiff or co-defendant and Rule 3:9.1 
specifically forbids third party prt:'.cticc. 
(B) Yes. By Rule 3:8 a defendant may countercla:i.m against the plai ntiff whether 
or not the claim arises out of the s uit. and whe·liher or not it arises in tort or 
contract. By Rule 3:9 he mc•Y cross-claim ae~im;t another defendant for any matter 
growing out of the claim for which he is being sued. 
(C) Yes ~s to the Plaintiff aB per Rule J;8 abvve; No as to X as such a claim 
does not arise out of the suit. (P. ule 3:9 above) 
(D) Yes as per Rule 3:8 above. 
(E) Yes as per nule 3:8 as against Plaintiff; No as r-er Rule 3:9 as to X. 
• 
• 
• 
lOo })fj a pending action by Smith against Daisy Dairy Corpc,ration(hereinafter called 
("Daiayn) in the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchbur g fer $25,000 for personal 
injuries caused by the explosion of an ammonia compre.ssor at Daisy ' s place of 
business in the City of Lynchburg, Daisy sought. to take the deposition of Smith in 
ordar to a8certain the names and addresses of Smith's witnesses and to secure from 
• Smith the contents of medical reports j.n his possession concerning his physical and 
mental condition. Smith opposed the taking of his deposition for any purpose and 
particularly with respect, to the mecl.ical rcport8. His poei tion concerning the 
medical reports was that they were privileged in that t.hoy were based upon a con-
fidential relationship E:Xist.ing betv;een physician and patiEmt. 
(A) What steps must be taken, and w'.1.::.t munt. be sho1·m, by Daisy to obtain an order 
requiring Smith to give a d.is~o-..rery d;:.pcsi"\:.ion? 
(B) May the order requiring the d is~overy d.eposi tion dire0·0 Smith to disclose 
the names and addrosses of Smith 1 s w-it.nes~es, and direct him to produce the medical R~ ~ ~I reports? Cpt..ttt-t~) (PLEADING AND PRACTICE) (A) Rule 3~ ~~ 3(r.:) roads, <ton motion of any party, the court, fJ.i.J. ·"4 · 0 . , if satisfied by affidavit: testimony, :i.nspcction of the pleadings or otherwise that 
f;v1b ~~ the moving part.y in good faith desire~ access by way of discovery t.o evidence, the 
~~ LT· names and addresses of witnessea, or other information subject to the control of ~ the adverse part.y or of a third pe::.~son, shall permit the taking oilt a deposition for 
:f(~t;t;;;:::..J. discoYery and shall en~er an orde:r requi:cing the adverse party ~r ~uch third 
.,._#.J,.l,_~ ~ person to attend at a t:une and pla.r;e and before a notary or comm1SS1oner named in 
_, ~ ·' the order and to answe:r questions relevant t o subjects named in the order and to 
lt;J;J(j~l make available for inspection, :;opying or photographing any writing, chattel or 
~t-..J.J;... real property described in the order. The court shall d eny the motion if it finds 
{.~ .::., 'i,t._~ . that gran·t.ing the motion vrould unreasona~~y delay the case or impose unreasonable 
-,..--.... hardship or expense on the adverse party. · 
• 
(B) Yes. V#8- 289 .. 1 which has to do with privileze between physicians and patients 
contains the following proviso:nprovidod: however, that when the physical or mental 
condition of the patient is at. issue in such ation, suit or proceeding or when a 
__ _ ._. 
ju::?.o0 of a court of record, in the exercisa of sound diEcretion, deems such d:i.3-
e;lo; ur e necessary to the proper administ.ra"dcn of jus tice, no fact cornR.unic.1t0•l tc, 
or otherwise l earned by, suc.h practitioner in connection with such atte~1anJe, ex<.LJil·• 
i:<ation or treatment shall be privileged anci disclosure may be required . And see 
204 Va. 11 on p.470 of Evidence Cas ec in these Notes. 
/ . 6~~{th respect to an i~ue out of chancer~ in a Virginia court, state-
(A) What is its purpose? 
(B) What should a party do to seek it? 
(C) To what extent is the result of such an issue binding on the chancellor? 
( PLEADI NG AND PRACTICE)(a) The purpos~ of a writ out of chancery is to obtain a 
finding of a material fact that is in such dispute that the chancellor needs the help 
of a jury. 
(b) By V#8-214 any court in which a chancery suit is pending shall have the dis-
cretion to direct an issue to be tried before any proof has been taken by either the 
plaintiff or defendant if it shall be shown by affidavit after reasonable notice that 
the case will be rendered doubtful by the conflicting evidence of the opposing par~y 
(c) The verdict of ~he jury is ordinarily only advisory. v ~ 
/ 
7 .:ftJhne driving north on U.s. Route 29, Tom Crock, a resident of Alberrnarle CountJr 
collided with a vehicle being driven south on the same Route by Ben Bard, a resident 
of Fauquier County. The collision occurred in Culpeper County. Shortly thereafter 
Crock brought an action against Bard in the Circmit Court of Albermarle County 
charging Bard with negligence in the operation of his vehicle and asking damages of 
$5000. In response to Crock's motion for judgment, Bard filed a demurrer which re-
cited, "Comes now the defendant and demurs to the plaintiff's motion for judgment 
and as the ground of such demurrer aver,s that _this court is without proper venue to 
hear the plaintiff's action." How should the court rule on the demurrer? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The demurrer should be over-ruled. Venue should be tested 
by a plea in abatement one of the requirements of 1.-.rhich would be to inform plaintiff 
as to the proper venue--i.ee "Give him a better \VTit". See Vf/8 -133. 
:JI._ -:."' 
10. From which, if any, of the following orders or decrees of the Circuit Court may 
the losing party properly petition for an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals? 
(a) An order setting aside a verdict for mhe plaintiff for $15,000 in an automobile 
tort action and granting a new trialo 
(b) A decree in a chancery suit adjudicating that the plaintiff, Rosemont Develop-
ment Corporation, instead of the defendant, XYZ Corporation, is the owner of a house 
and lot in Roanoke and directing a rpecial co~nmissioner to ascertain the liens 
against the property. 
(c) A decree holding invalid plaintiff's claim of an-alleged mechanic's lien of 
$250 on a house and lot which defendant had purchased f :com owner while the house 
was under constructiono 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(A) Since this is not a final order and no exception applies, 
no appeal lies. (B) Since the decree adju.di~ates the principles of the cause and 
affects the title to land it is appealable despite the fact that it is not final. 
(C) Since, as far as plaintiff is concerned, no title to land is involved and the 
pecuniary matter is less than $300 ·C.ha decree is not appealable. See V/lfl-462 and 
201 Vao934.j" 'I- t./6, 'I 
/ 
5P tri" an action to recover damages for personal injuries growing out of a.n automo-
bile collision, Sam Rakes charged in his motion for judgment that the defendant, 
Gus Mars, was guilty of negligence in three particulars, namely: 
nDriving to defendant's left of the cen::ber of the highw·ay and entirely 
in plaintiff's lane of travel; · 
r:Driving at an unlawful and excessive rate of speed; and 
nFailure to keep a proper lookout." 
Mars filed the gelling grounds of defense and no other pleadings: 
nDefendant states his grounds of defense as follOlfS! 
111. Defendant denies that he oparated his car on the wrong side of the road, 
as charged in the motion for judgment8 
"2o Defendant denies that he drove his car at an unlawful and excessive 
speed, as charged in the motion for judgment ~ 
"3. Defendant denies that he failed to keep a proper lookout, as charged 
in the motion for judgment. 
/ s/ Gus Mars11 
During the trial of the action plaintiff offered evidence to prove the averments 
contained in the motion for judgment and rested. Defendant then offered to prove 
that plaintiff drmve his car partially into defendant's lane of travel and that the 
collision occurred while both vehicles were in the center of the highway. Counsel 
for plaintiff objected to t he introduction of this evidence, How should thh court 
rule? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The objection should be sustained, Defendant cannot intro-
duce evidence of Plaintiff's contributory negligence unless he relies thereon in his 
statement of his grounds of defense, or Plaintiff's own ev5.dence shows that Plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence,. Rule #3:18 (h). 
6 :P~in Skin commenced an action in the Circmit Court of Albermarle County, V2 .• , 
Cl r,; "'in:Jt Hard Boiled to recover damag3G for defamation~ The motion f or judgment ~ 0~ 1-
J.:.ained two counts, one alleging facts upon which recovery was sought for ao!lnnon l av1 
slander the other count charging facts · upon which a recovery was sought, under the 
i nsulting words statute of Virginia. The motion for judgment did not aver f acts 
s uff:i.,:i ent to enti tle plaintiff to recover, and within twenty··one days aft0r lK :;:;_(~e 
of motion, for judgment was served on the defendant, counsel f or def endant f iled, 
as his only pl eading, a motion for summary judgment. 
How should the court rule on the motion for summary judgment? 
~PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The Cou:rt should overrule the motion. A motion for summ'lry 
JUdgment cannot be used as a substitute for a demurrer, nor can such a motion be 
granted before the parties are at issue. Rule 3:20 and 200 Va.604. 
• 
• 
• 
/ J)'S 7. In October of 1964, Ben Gum paid $30,000 to Tom Blunt, and in exchabge received 
from Blunt and recorded a deed purpo::.~ting to convey to Gu_'ll nRosemont Farm"· on which 
Blunt lived in Augusta County, Va. Shortly thereafter Blunt moved to th1 City of 
Roanoke. In November of 1965, Gum le2rned that Alfred Farr of Cleveland, Ohio, a 
few days before had recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Augusta 
County a deed dated Jun~ 16, 1962, which deed purported to show conveyance of 
"Rosemont Farm"' by Blunt, to Farr. Gum at once questioned Blunt concerning t!1e 
matter. Blunt admitted to Gum that be had delivered a deed to Farr before his 
dealing with Gum 9 but added that the deed had been delivered to Farr on the condi-
tion of payment of the pur~hase price, that. Farr had failed to make payment, and 
that he did not consider the deed to Farr -to be binding ~ 
Gum now consults you and asks(a) ~-Jhere artd by what court proceeding he might have 
determined his ownership of 11'Rc-semont. Farm11 , and (b) By v1hat means, if any, he migh~· 
in such proceeding obtain s2r'Vice on Farr as a party defendant. 
How should you answer each of these questiC!lr? 
(PJJEADING AND PRACTICE) The venue of the suit !.s August<:>. County, Va. as this would 
be a suit in rem to remove a cloud on the title and such a auit l-muld lie in the 
county in which the land is situated . Another way would be for Gum to seek a 
declaratory judgment to the effel.~t that Farr has no interent in the land. As for 
service of process, if Farr is sarved personally in Ohio that is the equivalent of 
service by publication in Virginia. And under the recently passed "Long Arm Statuten 
V#8-8l.l et seq .service on the Secretary of the Commonwealth is the equivalent of 
personal servi~e on Farr in Virginiao 
pb s 8 .. Tom Botts was indicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County, Va. for murder. 
On his arraig~ent he entered a plea of not guilty, was tried and convicted of fir::rt 
dagree murder. After the jury had been discharged, but before sentence had been 
imposed, Botts moved the court to permit him to >'li thcJraH his plea of not guilty and 
to file a plea in abatement to the indictment on the ground that the grand jury had 
not been legally summoned and two members of the grand jui7 were disqualified by lavr 
to act as grand jurors • 
The court overruled the motion, whereupon the defendant moved to set asi de the 
verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence. This latter motion was aJs o· 
overruled. Proper exceptions were noted by Botts to all rulings of the court. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals, Botts assigned as error the action of the 
trial court in overruling his motion to \-lithdraw his plea of not guilty and to file 
a plea in abatemento The record on appeal showed that before entering a plea of no·':. 
gllilty, Botts and his counsel knew that the grand jury had been improperly summoned. 
and that two of the grand jurors were not qualified to serve. · 
How should the court rule on this assignment of error? 
(Pleadlng and Practice) The cour·t should rule that this assignment of error is with-
out merit. The motion came too lv.te. Objectd!ons to the method of summoning the 
grand jury or to the qualifications of particular jurors mus t be made at a pre-
liminary state of bhe case, that is, before a plea to t he merits(l93 Va.814). The 
court will not permit the defendant to play fast and loose with it--if acquitted 
to go free--if convicted to have a new trial--and this is particularly true when 
defendant had knowledge of all the facts from the beginning. 
9 b~erb Adam brought an action against George Ross in the County Court of Chester-
fidd. County, and there recovered judgment. for $865. Ross promptly and properly 
a1Jp~aled the Cd.Se to the Cir·~ui t C01_1rt of Chesterfield County. Duriflg. th"" tria;L o:;_· 
ths case before a jury in the Circu1 t Court, counsel for Adam asked h::Lm the fol::.•Y.i ·· 
inO' auestion: ttDid you, or did you not, obtain a judgment against George Ross in 
·l:,hio 1 same case when it l-Jas tried in the County Court of Chesterfield County'? 11 
Counsel for Roos immediately objected to the question. 
Should the Circuit Court have sustained the objec'\iion? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE ) Yes, the objection should be sustained. The trial on appeal 
is a trial de novoo '((,)hat happened in the County Court is completely irrelevanc o 
3J~y-Products Corporation fiJ. t>d a. bill in equity in the Circuit Court of Goochland 
County, Virginia, against Williu.m S:;;nu r:::ls, trading as County Shopping Center. The 
purpose of the suit ·~oyas to enforce th8 Hen of a deed of trust on the land and 
buildings owned by Sav;1uels and us ed by him in the operation of his business. After 
the defendant had answ·~ .·."e~, the Court entered a decree of reference to a Master 
Commissioner of the Court with directions to report to the Court all of the assets 
of the defendant, the liens thereon and the order of their priority. After the 
entry of the decree of reference, Ball Point Company commenced a suit in the same 
court to enforce its judgment lien against the same property of Samuels. Novelty 
Company and Wholesale Company held judgment liens on the same property of Samuels 
and each proved the amount of their debts and their judgment liens before the 
Master Commissioner. 
1. Samuels appeared in the suit filed by Ball Point Company and moved the Court 
to dismiss the suit or to suspend the prosecution thereof. 
How should the Court rule on this motion? 
2. By-Products Corporation appeared in the suit that it commenced and advised 
the Court that Samuels had paid it one-half of the amount due on its lien and that 
it had accepted a note for the balance, secured by a deed of trust on other property 
of Samuels and it moved that the Court dismiss its suit. How should the Court rule 
on this motion? 
3. Seashore Amusement Co. held a judgment lien against Samuels which became 
barred by the Statute of Limitations after the decree of reference was entered in 
the suit commenced by By-Products Corporation. Nevertheless, Seashore Amusement 
Company appeared before the Master Commissioner in that suit and submitted proof of 
its claim. Samuels filed a plea of the Statue of Limitations to this claim. 
How should the Court rule on this plea? 
(EQUITY PROCEDURE) Part 1. Motion should be granted. The order of reference changed 
the original suit into a general creditor's suit and operated as an injunction 
against the institution of another creditor's suit against the same estate. (tile 
#432)The correct course for Ball Point to follow would have been to obtain leave of 
court to file an intervenor's petition in the pending suit under Equity Rule 2:15, 
or to merely prove its debt before the Master Commissioner under the original 
order of reference, in which case it will be treated in all respects as a party 
to the suit. 68 Va.922. 
Part 2. By-Products has lost dominion over the suit by the order of reference made 
for the benefit of all creditors and therefore no dismissal. 
Part 3. Statute of limitations tolled by the order of reference as to claims proved 
thereunder. Citations: Lyles, Equity Pleading, #430. Code #8-20. 
4f'~~ March 31, 1966, Machen instituted an action at law in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk against New Town Stores, Inc., and John Goodman, doing business as 
Old Time Restaurant, seeking a recovery of ~~25,000. The motion for judgment alleged 
that on January 2, 1965, as Machen was leaving the grocery store, whi ch was owned 
and operated by New Town Stores, Inc., he Has caused to fall and was injured because 
of a negligently maintained doorway; that he proceeded to his automobile, which was 
parked in front of the adjoining establishment , Old Time Restaurant, but because of 
feeling faint from his injuries, he sat down in front of the restaurant, that 
Goodman negligently procured and administered to him a substance which turned out to 
be concentrated household ammonia, from the ingestion of which he sustained perman-
ent internal injuries. New Town Stores, Inc., was served with process on April 1, 
1966, but Goodman was not served until May 2, 1966. What pleading should have been 
filed by counsel for each defendant and when? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Each of the defendants should file a demurrer within 21 days 
for misjoinder of causes of action. These were separate and divisible torts, as to 
which of the injuries were distinct, external in one c~se, internal in the other, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
and there was no concert of action. The two events did not culminate in the same 
injury. Burkes, #212; Norfolk, 188 Va.288. Acceptable alternative would be motions 
to dismiss or elect rather than demurrer. 102 Va.l48; 118 Va.$21. 
5~~Erter sued Newton in the County Court of the County of Surry, seeking a recovery 
in the sum of $47 for property damage to his automobile as the result of Newton's 
alleged negligence in a certain automobile accident. Fefore this case was trie1~ 
Newton, who was injured in the accident, sued Porter jn tb 9 Clrcu~_·::. Court o:f S1 ~.::-:r :y 
Co1mty, seeking a recovery for personal injuries for $~' S » 000, e.J.le: i:ri.ng tb.::. t .Pr,r t.::-r ~ s 
negligence caused the accident. Upon trial of the acti(-n in 'lihG Co;.mt.y (kt •.r t .ll 
judgment was rendered in favor of Porter in the sum of $47 . Porter there•.:;.pon filed 
a plea of res judicata and a motion to dismiss in the a•'1tion of Newton ag.:".ins t 
Porter still pe~ding in the Circuit Court. Newton fil'3L1 a motion to r.=je·:rt:, -~he 
plea on the er·;-:>anJ that the .)·J.ogm:=-•nt in the County Court v1as contra::-y to the la-;.r and 
the evideY:I'. ~~ 8.nc1 i·.Yas not reo j l.~'-U r :~ta becanse: 
(a) Th:3 r.our:Lty Com··v was a cor x··t. not of record, and a3 an inferior court, 
its j1~dgm.::nt ,,rou.ld not be binding on the Circuit Court, which was a 
court of ri:Y~ord .. 
(b) Th~.t the £:ub;j~ct matter w.?.s not the same, one cause being for property 
darr.~.g0 to Porter's automobi.la and the other for personal injuries to 
New+.(m. 
(c) 'l.'l.1.: ... t even th()ugh th~ Cou.n·::,y Court judgment was clearly erroneous, it we.13 not 
appe.alable to the Circuit Cc·urt or mr:r other court of record beca tls e i t vvr.\S 
for only $h7, whi~h was below the $!50 requi red jarisdio ~donal amount n11'1• 
therefore> the ju.'.igment could not be considered res judtcatat for t0 do so 
would depriYe Ne~·ton of his legal rights w:i."!:.hout a con;plete judicial hearing. 
Hm-r shoulc~ the Gircu:lt Court rule on each cont•Jntion? 
(PL"S.\DING AND PRACTICE) ~a) Innn::Lt'=lrial as to res j"udicata that county court was a 
con.'.."·li not of r ~ .:. o :rd. P3trus, 1.96 Va.322. 
(b ) The issue wa,J of negligence arising out of the same accident and therefore the 
f1n rl:>.mental issue is the same. 
(t:) The fact t h2.t county court judgment was not appealable did not af.foct appli~a­
bili ty of res j udicata ... Ander son, 189 Va. 793 o 
(P<:.:rhaps Newto:l should have counter-claimed in the county court for the juri:J-
Qtc. t :ional amount and t hen removed to the circuit court on increase of amo~~ffi of 
counter-claim) 
6[f~ungb~or:>d_, a p~~omi.sing young attorney, has just lost his first big r.arte in 
,, .. ~~ :: r h Bat·~:.e ~r:< , th~ \ C :Lr~ui t Jndge, clearly ignored the holding of the Su.rrcme 
C c1.,;~t. of A!;~)e<tk of llir~inia i n the "Holdover Case" decided less than four month3 
pr ,::viously on the preci sd i s;:me. 
Youngblood moved to f:~t as:Lde the verdict. This motion was ove!'ruled and Young-
blood noted his exce:p~ions. After filing a notice of appeal and e.ssignrnents of 
er ror, and efta;: procu.:ring o. certification of the tro.nG•::ript of the evlc:ence and 
other incidtSnt.s c•f t lvJ t:·ia:l. 9 You.~.gblood prepared and presented a peti t ii;.n for 
a.ppeal to the So.:: :r::o t;mo Court of AppGals • The petition f or appeal consi:3td entirely 
of a brief na:!' :>:!t:l .. va statement. of the facts of the casl3, and argument ir:. the 
following langu?. ~;-3: 
"While t.hi ':l case, filed ,r.:muary 15, 1966, was pending a similar defense 
in a case cf simi lar fa-~ts was considered and di f:posed of by this 
court in the case of Holdover v. Landlord, 212 Va. 3, 140 S.E. 2d 312. 
"The Holdover decision 1..ras announced after answe:!'s were filed to the 
petition in t he case a -:j bar. We respectfully subT~iit that the Lower 
Court in ent ering t.he j1 l..:igment herein complained of wholly ignored the 
law as was announ-;;ed ii1 ·the Holdover Case." 
E:r.:periene~ ,counsel for app(.)J..lee, moved the Court to dismiss the petition for 
aooeal. How should the Court rule on the motion? (PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Rule 5:3 of the Rules of Court provides that the petition 
f al in form and contents shall conform in a ll r espects to the requirements f~~ ~~~~~lant's opening brief. Rule 5:12, a1 set s forth a number of re~uirements, 
such a s statement of the proceedi ngs in the lower court, clear and conc1se state-
ment of the facts, each assignment of error to be suppo~ted by statement o~ . 
principles of l aw, argument and authorities, none of whlch have been complled Wlth, 
' and ao ellee ' s motion should be grant ed. Ni chol as, 180 Va . 203. 
_!Ji::l.L'>"" V:;IU 
5-- Ja ., .. r'rocedurcw. ~ . .. be )istributo:r· wrote"' ... 0nUf2.ctlirer a letter 111 vvhich Ma st;, ted ~ "If you 
1_.,:Li.l dulivc;r r·.e twenty gross of /..Y I; P..t):Jlianc..;s, I will deliv r. t nem 
to th '2 wiJ.olesaL-j r ;·, td el th~r collc~ct the i.mrcn ..:<Se lJrice from hun cJ nd 
r c:r~ ti t it to yoLl, or I will p ·y it myself." i•· ::mufa cturer accept~d 'the 
of.l:'er 1~ .. nd, .:;urau~mt the reto, ship ~~ ed t!le <::.pplL·nces to ')istributor. 
, ot rt~ c e ivin(l: tho _Jurch::1se price, 1 anufacturcr sul.)d )istributor .Cor 
it i~ the 1n ·J.:;e r Gircui "t C .. mrt, alleginF· in hts 11·.otion f or jud;~-m ent 
t tb.t t m~ <=~ . plinnc :s had been shipped to ;)istributor, and th ~-:·. 1. he had 
0i t h ·.:r fai.lc;:;d to colL;ct :t'rom ·,zlolcs ·,ler, or if hn h 0d collected, he 
h··d .T.' c::.iled to r emit tne mrcl'l ;-:~.sc price to • r nu.f ~1 ctur2r: tne lett()r 
,,,n s .:>.: -de •') rt of the motion. l)istri butar durr..urr (·:d to tr1e motion on 
tile g r ound trr::. t th ;.; allee; . tions \K .•.'e in tne; al t c.: rnati vc 2 ttd did not 
st · t .j v:;,ich {~ c ound W !• S r e li (U on :t'o:r r tJcov,; :r ,~' · 
HO'N ou,,:ht th: Cou~t "to rul e on the de r;,urr·er. 
'i'he d.;.nurr-.:r s hculd b ·:~ ove.cruled. 'L'nd .. ~ r ,{ule 3 : 1 3 a ple <:l.dint: sh~dl 
be su.t' c.'icL.:nt if it cl .:;arl~/ in/orms t:·Je op ,,osi te ) <.Tty o:t' thu true 
natura of t ic cl ·' im or d efenst:. J-:.owevur, alterna tive plc: ·- ·dint::, is 
permi t "t :d ' '.TiFm tr1 . ple~~. u. ,_: r h a s no knowled ~ _ :e as to ·,vhich of t wo s etsJ8t -
shou.ld be n .Ll~ ~:0 d m~ d t L .; o~Juo zi t e ~ > .-~ .r· t ;r would b(:: e quc.' .. '.ly lia')le ra • 
unul3r e i tn. )r. ·>,2c 20.5 'Fl. • 382. 
6-- \{a. ~--roc ,.! duru . 1)6 (. . . 
.\.lt 0 n '!!8.S o :1er :: t~n :; hl ~3 auto ::o rJ J.l e in c, irJc.: stt-)rly di.ccciion :-.nd att-
eElpted to overt · ic~ C"Ln d pa s s )ce.n c , 'l"h0 ~ .~, S (;j.l SO 0 p~ r2.t in ,~ ~ ~'trl hUto-
mobiLJ in the s ·FlC d L:c :~ction. Cr t• rw w .~; s o , e r e-.~, tine his F.lll torno .,ile 
in a n 88 st c r ly d i r:,; ct;ion on th .::) s ,· <.t~e hL~h w<:,.:.y o '1'be .r:·e vV 'c· s a t nree-way 
collision, P.G a r ·.; sul t o .r· · ~.rhi. ch all tnre . t-r; otorists were injured. 
Cr o--ne insti tutcd an C:.t ·; tion e:1gainst .' ~1 ton And je ~.' ne to r e covur do: ... mages 
for his injuri es . hl ton fil e d a countercl e:•im a e<:·inst Crane bec ·;.use 
of his injurie s e:.nd -)(~~::.nu r'il ·::d a countcrcL·irn ac~. inst •) r <::me bcc e.use • 
o.f his injuries an<i for a HOOO not e Cr ane owed him; h e Fllso fil ~:; ti f} 
cross-cl ~ iu1 a~ainst ~lton f or persona l injuri 8 s su st ~ in in the wreck. 
'fiz1e ly mot ions were !Ilr-!.d e as follO '?S ~ 
( \ ) 'l'o strike .)Ut J:.J. tonys count o;;; rcl r i:!'L• ag~Jinst Cr n e . 
( B) i.' o strike out :: e r:.ne's count e:,-·cL-,im :·or d a::·. <' , :cs a t-';e ins t Cr ,.ne. 
(C) To strike o u. t >ean~J 's counte;· cl aii:: on t •·;~, ; !lote., · 
(:')) 'l'o strike out 1 i e ;.~rw's crosscl ~·l im aeainst .·.lton for d 8.nl<-: __ cs . 
i·.ll motions s ~ • ollld be ov~rrul -" d• (- ,. 5. C.) Under itul e 3 ·8 <'1. ctefend-
<:.nt u:. y ,,Ji thin 21 -ays c; ·' "t c r S~.;rvice of notic .. of !. otion for jud2;ment, 
plea d as <."J. countcn~l ~. irn any c ,·,u. .e of n tion a t law ttu-1 t he h :.:i again-
st th::: i.J l a intiff or all ph-.intif.Cs jointly. It do w .. ~ not H1o t"Lcr 11Vhdlh-
er t he cla im ::~ riseu 011t o i' th (,; s r·mc tr;:ms 9.ction, wh~t . 1er it is liqumd-
8.t ed , or whether it arises ouc of tort or contr ~ ct. ( 0) Lnde r 1tuie 
3:9 a def'end.alC.!t m&y, ··1i t in the S<-J; fLO tin:c li rLi t a s for a counter-
cla im, ~?1 e d as c-1. cro nncl _,_im u ':. c c:.use of 9Cti on t l r; t h 0 h f'tS a,:,< .inst 
one o r- more othe r dof,mdnnts grDwing ot.~.t; of <m;; mc.~ tt ..: r plee.dc d in the 
motion fo r judgl!.cnt. 
7--Va. •'roccdurc }>' ~ 
Pedestri~n brou~t an action BG2ins t Call and )hrwin for damace s for 
_pe rson c1.l injurie s a llegc; d to h n.ve been suffe r ed by hiill in a collis-
~on ~ctwec~ an automobil~ ope~Rt ~d-by Call and a truck o~eratcd by 
~arwJ.n. botn of wnom d en1e d l1 s b1l1ty. ~t the c cnclusion o f a ll the 
evide~c ra bo ~h def~ndc--.nts mov e d l:or suP.l '' a ry j uct ,::m~n ts in the ir f avor • 
and t .~ ' e pl a 1ntiff for a directed v erdi c t in his f avor '1'11e Judn-e ""a'l· d· 
It '.t . 1 t . • ~ t') v • 
·, n e he ev1.11.~nc e is somewhat conflicting, y e t I am s a tis f ied tha t 
it pre{)ond ·:·r· ,t e s infavor of 6 a ll against Da rwin, t'lerefore I sustain 
• 
c a lj_ ·, s i·:otion• and SUI!t:r1ary judgment is t:~r ant e •.i in his fa~or, and ~s , I 
c.L'l s ,.; tisi .f' :)d that l)arwih is liable, I will instruct the JUr~ to f1na 
· n f avor of redcstrian against him for such sum, tl.ot exceed1ne; ~he ~nount sued for as the jury may believe will cvmpensate red~strl an 
for his injuries." Accord.ingly· , an or~er w.c.,s ez:mmred erant1ng. sU!Iilll-
a.ry judt:;;ment in favo: o~ Call and t !l8 Jury ws s l.n~t:ruc~~d t~ f1nd a 
v erdict a g ninst l)arwl.n for the d ama.::;es p~ove~t , wh1cn t uey dl.d and 
judement was enter0d the.:-·eon. .t>rope r <_:~bJ ectlons w·:!'e ritade to th8 
actions of th ; judge and proper excevt1.ons rre s 8rv:d by all parties. 
on a ppeal to th e:; :"3upreme Court of A.qper:l.~S of Vr.1.., . now out;ht that Court 
d e cide as to the correctness of the act1.on taken 1.n the lo··'Je r court 
With r GSlJCCt to: 
( 1) :Jall' s motion f or sumr·' ary jude, t~len t; 
( 2) ·rh 13 instruction to the jury to find a VG!'d ict in favor of l:"edes-
trian a.e;ain~:> t Darwin'? 
J oth actions cl!ould be r cvers8d. (1) Hule 3:20 provid..;s tl:.at sumr: .a ry jud ;~:·tent sl.H.ll not be entered if 
any :l1a t (~ ri ::.1 1 fact ill gcn c1.inely in dis r> u. t e . 
(2) Und \.: r ttul e 1:11 and Code 8-218, tn0 court lilHY not dir .Jct a v Gr-
dict except after sustEdn Lng a r:,otion to s trik.:: the ev Ldenc e or' the 
opposinG pa.rtj. 
9-- 1Te. . r roc edurc 1>6' (1) iillt~.J · c d decl:ddd . tha t he :!lu s t ~3e·~k em injunction agains t i 1opez 
in orde r to r e str· ·in the 1 s: t t<ar from in t erf e rrinc vti th cert e:~ in bus-
iness ri ght s of ·Iillard. ·dlL . .rd instl tut ed t he proper proc0eding in 
chance ry in t nc Gircui t Court of f·,orth.hampton Gount,v, but due to var-
ious circumstc-; n.c es , a full h~arin;~· on the injunction could not be ob-
t a ined for s on.e time e..1d j.~op o z h ad good r r::,.s on to beli ..J ve tta t he 
would lose the t e stimony of c ert ~, in im .;ort :.:nt wimnesses bece.uo e of 
death or remove.l from t he coun'ty befo r e tha t t.ime • 
''ihat, if a nything, cru1 Lopez do to protect hi ·· .s e lf a c;ainst a loss of 
this testimony'? 
( 2) ')alter w s confront E.: d with thiJ same situation in reg~1.rd to L·ur-
dock, but due to c e rtain circumst :-tnces , h e could not institute his 
suit in the Circuit r~ ourt of .ortharrip ton Count.v for som . J time c.nd 
i·; a k r;r h . < good r ...;asufl t o bel it~ ve t t1 r' t he \Mould lo se "trte 't ~ stimony of 
iL.r )ort :J.n t wimncss ..; s be c <:use of death or r <:!moval fro u1 t!le county before 
t rw th•e h "' could institute suit. 
:n0 t, i ~· an ·.: thinc; , c an '1Ltk e r do to prote ct hi ;·tself a gain s t H1e lo ss 
of tl·tis t es timony? " \ t, 
ll _,f tll l 
(1) l_,".nd Gr 'fa . 8-304 and ttule ): ?~, in any pendin{~ c as ~::: , tho de posit-
ion d e be n e OS !.; e of a wn'tlme:m3, may be t a ken i n this st ,- tc , a:t' t e r the 
motion J'or judr.;.rr.~nt . or bil l has been fil ~- d f ..; r t h....: c;ooc.l f~ i th purpose 
of t akin~ Emd introducin . ~ the t e s timony of a win:Js s who 1" 1 <-~ y not b~ 
acle t0 a ttend tn j tri a l of a c ~se . · 
(2) 1Jn d (; r Va . 8-317, 1vh-::r·e t r1 ~1'C is not yes a suit penlinp; one may 
fil e h bill in Chan.:.:e ry to PtDIR:e;itua1:lre t 8stimony. 'l_'nc ~~='~ rt:;' d...:s irir..g 
t~at t ne t ~ s~imony be~ must a ll ..![}..J t hc-.:.t he is not i n a ,:;~­
S1 tion t u br1n~ an uct1on wh,;..c'u1n t hG f a cts C<m ,,e i m: e di a t e ly inv .,,.. ti ~e. t e d t::Ln d the t e ~~i l rJ on.{ should D8 taken t o ;Jr ...: v ent its loss i')efo~· ~ · t rcr;~ a ction i8 possl.Dle . : :> e·~ N.I/A •. : 203 Va . 665. c; 
~0--Va. r 'rOC \:)durc ))~' . . 
·>yl an, a m ~rnot;r of a swln{3;ln{~ group known ~s the " oulderinc- , oss-· 
h , n eers••, r 8covcr ;d ;_,, jude:•r~~nt in t..h e Corpora t -~ on Court of the '...:i ty 
of Chesapeake, Va., jointly aeainst Gunny e:md Ch•..: r y l in the trial of 
an action at lavv se .-~kine: a r e covr.:;1 y f<r d c•.mar,es. 'Jylan all eged and 
prov~d th8.t. he sust a ined shock End burns as a rcsul t of trw nee ligence • 
of Cheryl in plug inG a knO '''ffi defective cord i •:-co his e l ectric GUitar 
and handinG it to 'iun w, who, in ib.zrm., nee ligently t.hr ew it into t he 
bathtub wh8r e Dylan W<iS t ak ing his annual b&.th. 
Sunny and Cheryl a:)i) ..: <-.-•l <)d from th ) jud (~ lr£ nt a :_;u inst th ;m on the ground 
that erroneous instruct.ions had b8 ;n ~iven by th~ tri a l court, to which 
instructions proper 0xc e;J tion h a d been t a k cm& 'l.he Suprem-a Court of 
Appeals o f Ja . found th~t the r e w~ s sufficient evidence of n8eli c ence 
to support a verdict a &ainst both de fendants, but that r~versible error 
had been cornr~i tt e d in instructions as t o Jun .-l '' w! · ich ~l<llll.Qi entitle 
him t o a n t;1'\l trial, but. tha't no r e v e rstble Gr~ or ha d be en COi(lJr,i t ved as 
to Gh.:?ryl. 
Und e r tn r.:;se circumst .·ncu s , whP.t action snould the Su!)reme Co'..lrt of 
Appeals of V&. t~ke ? 
'l'he c ourt sbould af/ir,:! th ~~ jud {~!n .mt as to ' ~h cry l ar.:.d r ,1verse and re-
ma11d as to 0unnf . i'l.s -.:iunn. and r.Jheryl VJ(-; ra ro und to be joint tort-
~! as~~s th8y w0r8_each suvcrally liable f or the ~ ntire judernc nt • 
.t:ncrvfor e , ruvc rs J.n ~', as to ::>unn.y or1ly ' ;ould not ha v e t be effect of 
incrc::i sinc- Cheryl's liability . Cheryl has h ;.:l.d h :1J day in court and 
~ould n 0t e~ t a fre ~ rid~ jus t be cause error wa s co m .it ct in r e -
W'~-rd to junny. :.>eo 20S va. 214 <:And 205 -.fa . 727. 
7 :f~J the trial of an a.otion at law, the record showed only the following proceed-
ings in the Circuit Court with reference to a question asked a witness: 
Counsel for plaintiff: "Where were you on the night of this occurrence?' 
Counsel for defendant: 11 ! object." 
Court: "Objection overruled.n 
(a) Assume that there was an adverse judgment and counsel for the defendant applied 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of error(appeal), and assigned this 
action of the Circuit Court as error. 
What answer ought counsel for the plaintiff make to this assignment? 
(b) Assume that instead of overruling the objection, the reoord showed only: 
"Objection sustained11 , and counsel for t~1e plaintiff assigned this action as cross-
error. What answer ought counsel for the defendant make to this assignment? 
(APPELLATE PROCEDURE) (a) Plaintiff should object to the consideration of the 
assignment. There is nothing in the record to show that an exception was made by 
defendant to the court's rulings and the ground of the objection was not stated as 
required by Rule 1:8 of the Rules of Court-204 Va.634,637 202 Va.300,308. 
(b) Counsel for defendant should object to the consideration of the assignment. 
There is nothing to show what the answer would have been and in the absence of 
this information it cannot be said that it would have been material. 157 Va.699,708. 
B.~';? a chancery suit in the Circuit Court a final decree was entered on June 1, 
1967, finding among other things that nJane Smith, as widow of Robert Smith, is 
entitled to dower in Whiteacre.tt The term of court adjourned June 20th. The find-
ing as to Jane Smith was cle~rly erroneous, as the record showed that Robert Smith 
had only a life estate in Whiteacre. 
You are consulted on June 26th as to how, if at all, this finding may now be 
corrected in the Circuit Court over the objection of Jane Smith. 
(EQUITY PLEADING) The finding as to Jane Smith, being clearly erroneous upon the 
face of the record may be corrected by filing a bill of review within six months 
of the decree. Because the error lies in the face of the record, it is not necessary 
to obtain leave of court to file the bill. Va.Code 8-613. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
']ti 3. An automobile driven by Smith, and in which Plaintiff was riding, collided with 
one driven by Jones in the City of Radford, Virginia. Smith died as a result of 
injuries received in the accident. Johnson, a resident of Roanoke County, qualified 
in the Circuit Court of Montgonery County as Administrator of Smith's Estate. 
Plaintiff, Smith and Jones were all residents of Montgomery County. 
Plaintiff instituted in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County an action against 
Johnson as Administrator of Smith's Estate and against Jones as joint defenaan~s, 
seeking to recover for his personal injuries sustained in the accident. The defend-
ants filed pleas in abatement in proper form in which they alleged that the cause of 
action did not arise in Roanoke County but in the City of Radford; that Jones did 
not reside in Roanoke County but in Montgomery County; and that the personal 
residence of the defendant administrator, Johnson, was not sufficient to afford 
proper venue in the case. 
{a) How should the court rule on the pleas in abatement? 
(b) List all proper venues for this cause of ac~ion and state the basis of each. 
(c) State the time limitation and the pleading stage at which a plea in abatement 
may be properly filed. 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) {a) The court should sustain the pleas in abatement. The 
only basis for suit in Roanoke County was that the administrator resided there. 
Section 8-38{1) provides that venue is proper in any county or city wherein any of 
the defendants live. But it was legislature's intent that this should apply to a 
defendant in his individual capacity and has otherwise specifically provided by n, ·' 
#8-38(5) for venue of an action or suit against an administrator where will was -
probated or fiduciary qualified.{203 Va.7) 
(b) Venue would be proper in: Montgomery County because if is where nany11 or De-
fendants reside #8-38(1) or where the administrator qualified #8-38(5), and; 
City of Radford because the cause of action arose there. #8-39. 
(c) The plea in abatement must be filed within twenty-one(21) days after service 
of notice of motion for judgment on the defendant. Rule 3:6/ 
Pleading stage is after service of motion for judgment and must be before {or 
simultaneously with) demurring, pleading in bar, or pleading to merits. It need not 
be filed upon a special appearance. 
4~J January 1, 1964, Patrick received what was believed to be minor injuries in an 
automobile accident while a guest in Henry's car. Because of the friendship of the 
part.ies Patrick neither instituted an action against Henry nor tried to effect a 
compromise settlement. While filling out his income tax return on April 15, 1966, 
Patrick became ill and 3 days later he died. His attending physician concluded that 
the accident in 1964 wa~a proximate cause of his death. The executor of Patrick's 
estate instituted a death-by-wrongful-act action against Henry on June 5, 1967, 
in the Circuit Court of Bedford County, Virginia. 
With respect to how the accident occurred Plaintiff merely alleged: 11Henry operat-
ed his automobile in which Patrick #88 a guest in a grossly negligent manner, and 
as a proximate result of his gross negligence Patrick died." 
Henry demurred to the motion for judgment on the ground that it was not sufficient 
in law in that it did not set forth the manner in which Henry was grossly negligent 
He also filed a plea in which he alleged that the action was barred by the applica-· 
ble statute of limitations, without specifying the particular statute relied upon. 
Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the plea. 
(a) How ought the court to rule on the demurrer? 
(b) How ought the court to rule on the motion to strike the plea? 
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) The court should overrule the demurrer. An allegation or 
negligence or contributory negligence is sufficient without specifying the particu-
lars of the negligence.Rule 3:18(d). 
(b) The court should overrule the motion to strike the plea. An allegation that 
an action is barred by the statute of limitations is sufficient without specifying 
the particular statute relied on. Rule 3:18(i). 
(Note that executor brought action within two years after Henry's death as re-
quired by #8-634 and is not demurrable on that ground but the right of action is 
dependent (#8-633) upon deceased being able to maintain action if he had survived 
and would have been subject to 2 year statute of limitation under #8-24, compl,anoe 
with which must be affirmatively set out by the plaintiff. 
5 -{t;j { ~'j. ~ ana Accused was indicted for embezzlement on April 1 1967 in the Ciro it ~~urt 0~ Carroll County, Virginia. She was thereafter ar;ested'pursuant to~ 
pias lssued.on xhe indictment. Before arraignment her attorney moved the court to fua~h t~e ~nd1ctment on the ground that there had been no preliminary hearing prior 
0 er 1nd1ctment. How should the court rule? (~RO?E~URE) The ~ourt should overrule -the motion to quash. The requirement of a 
pfellmlnary ?ear1ng in felony eases is not jurisdictional (H19nl-163.1)and purpose 
~i ~uch hear1?g was served by the grand jury's finding of probable cause. Pre-
(2~~~::2t)ar1ng is required only where one is arrested prior to indictment. 
9.~iJe Circuit Court of Roanoke County granted Plaintiff judgment against the De-
fendant for $1,500 by its order of January 16,1967. Pursuant to notice to Plaintiff, 
the Defendant tendered to that court on March 10, 1967, a "Statement of Testimony." 
The statement consisted of a narrative recital of the Defendant's version of the 
testimony given by the witnesses. Although the Plaintiff objected that the State-
ment of Testimony was not accurate and complete, he did not tender a written state-
ment of his version of the evidence. 
The trial court, being of the opinion that the Defendant's Statement of Testimony 
did not accurately and completely set forth the testimony in the case, declined by 
its order of March 15 to certify said statement but did attach it to its order. The 
Defendant objected and excepted to the action of the court. 
On appeal, the Plaintiff insisted and the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the 
several assignments of error concerning the trial court's ruling on the merits of 
the case could not be considered because there was no transcript or narrative state-
ment of testimony in the record, as the statement tendered by the Defendant was not 
signed by the trial judge. 
Under these circumstances what action, if any, sh~uld the Supreme Court of 
Appeals take in regard to Defendant's assignment of error relative to the refusal 
of the trial court to sign the Statement of Testimony tendered by Defendant? 
(APPELLATE PROCEDURE) Under Va. Rule 5:1 paragraph 10, it is stated, "If disagree- • 
ment as to the contents of a record should arise between counsel •••• ,the question 
shall be submitted to the judge and decided by him.n Thus it is the duty of the 
trial judge to reconcile any differences and formulate an accurate record. If be-
cause of the ~apse of time or lack of memory(as here) the judge cannot accomplish 
this result, he should then order a new trial. The case should be remanded to the 
trial court with instructions to follow this procedure. See 203 Va.946. 
• 
4J~~ Sept. 14, 1967 Adam Brice, a resident of the City of Richmond, while driving 
his automobile through a street intersection in that City, struck and injured 
Charles Dow, a pedestrian who resided in Hanover County, Virginia. On October 2nd 
Brice and his wife locked up their home in Richmond, leaving no one in charge, and 
left for a vacation in Miami, Florida. On October 5th Dow brought an action against 
Brice by filing a motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of Hanover County to 
recover $2,500 for his injuries. The notice of motion, issued by the Clerk, to 
which was attached a copy of Dow's motion for judgment, was delivered to the 
Sheriff of the City of Richmond for service. On October 9th, the Sheriff of the 
City of Richmond took the notice of motion and the motion for judgment to the 
residence of Brice and, finding no one at home, posted the papers on the front door 
of the residence and made his return of proof of service to the Circuit Court of 
Hanover County. When Mro and Mrs. Brice returned to the City of Richmond on November 
27th, Brice was surprised to find that Dow had obtained judgment by default against 
him for ~~2,500 in the Circuit Court of Hanover County on November 5th. Brice asks 
your advise on(i) whether he may have the judgment set aside for improper service 
of process, and(b) whether he may have the judgment set aside for improper venue. 
How should you advise him on each of these points? 
(VA. PROCEDUHE) The judgment may not be set aside for either reason. Under Virginia 
Code 8-51 and the Virginia Rules, substituted service by posting a copy of the 
summons on the front door of the person's usual place of abode is expressly allowed. 
Brice had not changed his place of abode, but simply left for a temporary vacation. 
While the venue was incorrect, Richmond being the proper place of venue, an object-
ion must be raised by a plea in abatement filed within 21 days from service of 
process. Under Virginia Rule 3:6, absolutely no extension of time is allowed. 
See 204 Va.96. 
"7 5J~n June 12, 1967, Henry Brown, the administrator of the estate of Rupert Thomas 
deceased, commenced an action in the Corporation Court of Danville against Ervin ' 
Jackson. In his motion for judgment Brown alleged that on May 30, 1965 Jackson was 
driving a motor vehicle in the City of Danville, that Jackson drove his motor 
vehicle at a high and unlawful rate of speed into the intersection of First and 
Clay Streets, that at the same time Thomas was properly walking across the inter~ 
section, that Jackson then negligently caused his vehicle to strike Thomas killing 
him instantly, and that the estate of Thomas thereby suffered damage for $35,000 
for which judgment was sought. Within twenty-one days after being served with the 
notice of motion for judgment, Jackson filed grounds of defense in which he denied 
that he was driving his motor vehic)(e at a high or unlawful rate of speed at the 
time it struck Thomas, denied that he was negligent in the operation of his vehicle 
and alleged that Thomas was himself guilty of contributory negligence which caused ' 
his death. Jackson filed no other pleading. On October 16th, the action was tried 
before a jury which returned its verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000. 
on the same day the Court entered judgment in that amount for Brown as administrator. 
on October 30th, Jackson filed with the Court a motion to set aside the judgment for 
Brown and to enter summary judgment for Jackson. As the ground for his motion 
Jackson asserted that the judgment in favor of Brown as administrator could not 
stand because the action against Jackson had been brought more than two years after 
the death of Thomas. Brown opposed the granting of Jackson's motion on the grounds 
(a) that the defense of Jackson came too.~ate in that it was not raised before the 
jury retired, and (b) that such defense was n?t raised by_a special plea of the 
statute of limitations. Should Jackson's mot1on be sus~a1ned? . . 
(VIRGINIA PHOCEDURE) Both objections are errone?us. A. flnal ~ud~ent rema1.ns ~l~hin 
the trial court for a period of 21 days and dur1ng wh1ch per1.od 1t may be ~od1f1ed 
rsed under a proper motion. A motion can properly be made to set as1de a 
or reve . d . th 21 d . d judcment which is invalid on its face at any t1me ur1.ng e . ays per1o and 
d t be made before the jury retires. Secondly, when a r1ght such as a wrongful ~eethno tion is created by statute then any limitation created by the statute is 
_ea ~c f that rieht and must be alleged and proven by plaintiff. A defendant in 13 far 0 tion need not plead the special statute in his defense, but may move the ~~~:ta~oa~et aside any judgment in plaintiff's favor where it is plain that plaintifj 
did not bring his action within two years. See 172 Va. 413. 
6Jp~~L Kirby brought an action against Red Apple Grocery Co., Inc. in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Hopewell to recover damages of ~~10,000 allegedly sustained as a 
result of tainted meat eaten by Kirby after its purchase from Red Apple. Kirby's 
pleading was poorly drawn, and Red Apple filed a demurrer to the motion for judgment 
on the ground that it failed to state a case upon which relief could be granted. 
The Court sustained the demurrer and entered an order reciting: "The Court being of 
opinion that the plaintiff's motion , for judgment fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, the defendant's demurrer thereto is hereby sustained, to 
which action of the Court the plaintiff excepts." Two months after this order was 
entered, Kirby moved the Court for leave to amend his motion for judgment. Red 
Apple opposed the motion on the ground that the order sustaining the demurrer was a 
final judgment and that Kirby's motion to amend came too late. 
How should the Cburt rule? 
(VA. PROCEDU!!E) The Court should overrule both contentions. A ruling which sustains 
a demurrer is not a final over adjudicating the merits of a case. The Court did 
not decide the case, but merely held the pleadings to be inadequate. Under Va. Rule 
3:13 all matters relating to the filing of pleadings may be reviewed and corrected 
by the Court and the time allowed for filing pleadings may be extended by the Court 
in its discretion, and such extension may be granted though the time fixed has 
already expired. See 194 Va.39h, Rule 3=13,3:21. 
T.)J:~ior, an infant of 20 years, entered into a contract to sell Blackacre to 
Jones for 1~50,000. When Jones tendered the purchase price, Junior declined to convey 
the property. Jones then instituted a suit in the Circuit Court of Albemarle 
County, Virginia, against Junior for specific performance. Junior requests you to 
assert as his only defense his infancy, He also says that, if possible, he would 
like to have a jury trial. 
(a) What pleading should you file on behalf of Junior? 
(b) Under what circumstances may a jury trial be secured? 
(VA. PROCEDURE) In suits in equity in Virginia a defendant may raise a single de-
terminative fact by filing a plea in bar. If such fact is determined in defendant's 
favor it will be a complete bar to the other party's claim. Under Va.Code 8-213, a 
party raising such a plea in bar is automatically entitled to a right to trial by 
jury on this one determinative fact issue. See 204 Va.4 and Phelps p.32. 
• 
• 
